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Abstract

The advancement in small unmanned aerial vehicle (SUAV) technology has
brought a new revolution in the military domain. Their uses have become more
synonymous with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. Concerns over
their flight test safety and accountability have been addressed in multiple policies to
mitigate mishaps and increase proper accountability. However, current DoD and FAA
mandated regulations and policies concerning UAV flight tests are sometimes considered
slow and time-consuming, which may lead to delays in UAV research and development.
This study explores the quantitative and qualitative measure of benefits associated
with an abbreviated flight test process for SUAVs. Specifically, it examines the current
agreement between two major USAF research centers regarding the SUAV flight test
approval process. This research utilized high-level multidisciplinary approaches and
techniques including qualitative cost-benefit analysis, interviews, value stream mapping
(VSM) analysis, and heuristic risk analysis to evaluate the current-state process. The
findings conclude that there is a slight economic cost and schedule savings in an
abbreviated process. Additionally, this research finds no correlation between SUAV
flight mishaps and system maturity. This research proposes using a streamlined process
for additional safety reviews to eliminate non-value added process steps considered
unnecessary due to the nature of the SUAV complexity. Furthermore, this study
recommends using a decision rule matrix based on the total cost of the SUAV and its
weight and energy at impact for choosing an abbreviated flight test safety review process.
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UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE FLIGHT TEST APPROVAL PROCESS AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS: A METHODOLOGIAL APPROACH TO CAPTURE AND
EVALUATE HIDDEN COSTS AND VALUE IN THE OVERALL PROCESS

I. Introduction
“For once you have tasted flight, you will walk the earth with your eyes tuned skywards,
for there you have been and there you will long to return.” – Leonardo da Vinci

Historically, humans have approached flight test process and evaluation with
scientific methods since the early days of aviation. Mankind has always been fascinated
with flight and the ability to control the sky. Examples range from early attempts such as
Greek mythology’s Icarus’ wings to real scientific approaches like Leonardo da Vinci’s
ornithopter. By the late 19th century, the race was on to build the world’s first powered
and controlled flying machine. Numerous flight designs and tests were done by scientists,
engineers, and flight enthusiasts competing for the title of the first to sustain heavierthan-air human flight; and in the process, all of them took some form of risks, including
those to their own safety. In 1903, brothers Orville and Wilbur Wright took their first
successful human-controlled airplane to the air in that historic twelve-second flight and
created a new chapter in human innovation. There is no doubt that the Wright brothers
had tested various methods for their conceptual flight and preliminary designs before they
could control the craft with three-axis control and the correct airfoil design. These
pioneers of aviation who experimented with gliders and biplanes laid the groundwork for
later generations to build more sophisticated advancements in aerodynamics and engine
technology that will power them to new frontiers.
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Fast forward a hundred years later, human ingenuity and breakthroughs in
machinery have enabled mankind to travel to space and control the air from the ground a
thousand miles away. The risks and safety involved in experimenting with new
technology have always been a challenge to those who flight tested them; those who tried
to experiment with aerial control will often find themselves confronted with failures that
may result in putting their lives in harm’s way. Despite the risks associated with flight
tests, many organizations and government centers continue to set improvement targets
with different purposes to control the sky using various methods including the newest
marvel of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).

1.1 USAF Flight Test Process
Different sources and organizations reference their UAVs in different ways. The
nomenclature for an unmanned aerial vehicle is not standard across the industry; some
have termed these vehicles as remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), or remotely operated
aircraft (ROA), or unmanned aerial systems (UAS). For the purpose of this paper, the
term unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) will be used to indicate any aircraft capable of
flight without a human operator on board. Small UAVs (SUAV) specify vehicles that are
measured a few feet across in length and wingspan, and these are typically found in
surveillance, urban terrain operation, communications relay, and reconnaissance.
Recent development and the ease of access to global positioning systems (GPS)
and remote controlled instruments have led to an increase in SUAV research and
development (R&D) in the United States (U.S.) and the world in general. It is now
possible for a radio-controlled aircraft builder to manufacture SUAVs based on user
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requirements and needs. The acceptable low risk and low cost in SUAV systems to
operate in the battlefield have gained the attention of the military, causing it to engage in
more R&D. Acceptable low risks and low costs are generally defined as the likelihood of
an event whose probability of occurrence is subjected to an acceptable risk at a minimal
loss but perceived as having greater benefits. The rapid pace of SUAV manufacturing
processes has enabled many organizations and the military to conduct a different means
of research that may prove critical to national defense and security by utilizing SUAVs to
perform various missions, such as border patrol; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR); and autonomous surveillance and patrol tasks on the battlefield.
Presently, flight approval processes for SUAVs in the U.S. national airspace are
mandatory in order to satisfy flight requirements as regulated by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). Routinely, this process can sometimes take a few weeks to a few
months (FAA, 2011).
There is an abundance of literature that describes the flight test approval process
for larger and manned aircraft, including those from the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, FAA,
and other national test ranges (Ward, 2006; Ingham, 2006; De Garmo, 2004). Similar to
manned aircraft, the need to increase safety, reliability, and accountability on UAV
performance necessitates flight test approval processes, as these SUAVs are becoming
more autonomous. The purpose of a flight test approval process is to bring in multiple
experts from different disciplines to strengthen the shared safety and technical
responsibility between the approving authority and the operators. It is aimed at improving
standards in aviation safety and technical feasibility of the vehicle. Normally, a flight test
or ground test approval process accomplishes two main objectives: (1) finding and fixing
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any identified aircraft design problems in the test plan and safety plan and (2) addressing,
verifying, and documenting the flight test authority and the responsibility of the people
involved in the process according to applicable standards and regulations (Ward et al.,
2006). These two main objectives bring the flight test process to a minimal level of
acceptable risk, which is the lowest risk possible after all hazards have been eliminated or
mitigated (Ward et al., 2006).

1.2 Problem Statement
Currently, numerous safety requirements as well as lessons learned from previous
tests have resulted in improved UAV design, engineering, and maintenance. Most flight
test techniques and procedures for SUAVs are rather simple due to their designs and low
cost and maintenance. However, regardless of how simple or complex these SUAVs can
be, they are normally treated the same as manned aircraft when it comes to the flight test
approval process in the USAF, and also by the FAA. There are also challenges created by
flight mishaps that require additional time and resources to approve the “return to flight”
of the mishap UAV. A return to flight approval is required once a vehicle is involved in a
crash or mishap that results in property damage or injuries. The current UAV flight test
approval process assumes the same resources and manpower are available that the
majority of manned and larger aircraft projects have. Given the design and developmental
scope of SUAVs and their lack of sophisticated hardware, it is hypothesized that the
predominant flight test approval process for manned and larger aircraft may not be
suitable for SUAVs.
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To improve the process for SUAV flight tests, a recommendation is needed to
determine the overarching applicable standards and regulations for a SUAV flight
approval process. This new recommendation should sufficiently increase the planning
and development process for SUAVs that may be targeted for rapid product development
for the warfighters, while adhering to safety and flight test regulations and risk
management.

1.3 Research Objectives
In narrowing the scope of this study, the main objectives are to establish
quantitative and qualitative measures of benefit for an abbreviated flight test process for
SUAVs relative to its resource and schedule costs versus using the flight test process used
primarily for manned and larger aircraft. In particular, the research will focus on the sizes
and costs of the UAV as a way to determine the appropriate recommendation for a formal
flight approval process. Additionally, this research will also determine whether or not
SUAV flight tests should adhere to current standards and regulations based on their
simplicity, cost, and urgency. Finally, this research will explore the benefits and risks
involved when not using the current process as set out by the USAF.

1.4 Assumptions and Limitations
Several significant assumptions were required for the comparison of the flight test
approval process between SUAVs and larger manned aircraft to be feasible and practical.
One primary assumption is the work value in resources and manpower added to each
program will be different from each other; particularly, SUAV programs do not require as
many resources and manpower as those of larger manned aircraft programs. Another
5

assumption is the system complexity and safety guidelines of both types of vehicles are
assumed to be different due to the nature of manned versus unmanned aircraft (i.e.,
manned vehicles are more complex and require a higher standard of safety guidelines
than unmanned SUAVs). Lastly, the risk assessment and management from both classes
of vehicles are also assumed to be different, that is, SUAVs are sometimes expendable
because of their low manufacturing and operating costs.
There are more than a few flight test processes nationwide (Ward et al., 2006),
each with different approving authority and policies to make flight tests happen. Since
this is exploratory research, this research will use the flight test process being utilized at
Edwards Air Force Base (AFB) to make assessments and recommendations on the flight
test approval process and its implications associated with SUAVs. It is recommended that
future follow-on research should seek to validate and generalize this approach and
methodology.

1.5 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2: Literature Review, will examine the background in flight test approval
process and its implementation, as well as the literature on the current flight test process
and issues with traditional flight test methods for SUAVs. Chapter 3: Methodology, will
discuss the methodology in collecting data and how each step in the process will be
analyzed, as well as the scope of the projects involved. Chapter 4: Results and Analysis,
provides analysis and results of this research. And finally, Chapter 5: Discussions and
Conclusions, will summarize this research and present findings and recommendations for
the flight testing SUAVs, along with recommendations for future research.
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II. Literature Review

The purpose of this chapter is to understand the current literature on the small
unmanned aerial vehicle (SUAV) flight test approval processes. This chapter starts with
the history of flight test requirements and reviews the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) between the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and the Air Force Flight
Test Center (AFFTC) covering flight operations oversight of AFRL flight test programs
and the authority and responsibilities from both organizations. The importance of flight
tests will be discussed with factors affecting flight test methods. A short overview of the
large potential military market for SUAVs will be presented. Lastly, a brief description of
various popular known flight certification processes, including those from the FAA and
other international agencies, will be discussed.

2.1 MOA between AFRL and AFFTC
Before AFFTC involvement in AFRL’s flight test process, AFRL had been
conducting a series of manned and unmanned flight tests ranging in various sizes from
desk-sized UAVs to larger manned cargo aircraft. However, after a series mishaps and
accidents (AFRL T&E Office, 2011), the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) directed
that a rated Operations Group Commander provide oversight for all flying activities
involving military, government civilian, or contractor flight operations (AFMC/A3,
2006). By AFMC direction, the 412th Operations Group (OG) was identified as the Flight
Operation Authority (FOA) for all AFRL flight test programs, except for the AFRL
Munitions Directorate (AFRL/RW) for which the 46th OG (Eglin AFB) provides this
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oversight. Edwards AFB is the home of AFFTC, including the 412th OG, and is one of
the major flight test centers in the U.S. with the expertise to support and provide guidance
to program managers (PM) at AFRL before approving any flight operations. The
requirement for the 412th OG involvement in AFRL Test and Evaluation (T&E) is
formalized in the MOA that was established in May of 2006 (2006-06-06MA). The MOA
states:

“The AFFTC has responsibility for the safe and effective conduct of flight
operations for AFRL research programs requiring flight activities. The
AFMC/A3 defers OPCON to the 412th Operations Group Commander
(OG/CC) for AFRL research programs involving military, government
civilian or contractor flight operations. To avoid duplicate reviews,
inspections or evaluations, an integrated team approach for conducting
program flight operation oversight will be used.”

Deferring operational control (OPCON) to AFFTC for all AFRL flight operations
includes a variety of programs ranging from small remote controlled (RC) aircraft, such
as micro sensor test-beds, to full-scaled aircraft with advanced composite structures. The
intent of the MOA is to have experienced flight testers review AFRL programs by
providing insight and involvement on flight test programs by test pilots and flight test
engineers. The personnel who review AFRL test plans are usually those who have
experience with flight operations and also those who have graduated from the USAF Test
Pilot School, which is also at Edwards AFB.
There are certain requirements and procedures that AFRL and AFFTC must
collaborate together on to have a flight test program approved for flight status. These
responsibilities include AFRL providing monthly summaries for flight activities and
notes, as well as UAV airworthiness from their safety review boards (SRB). Furthermore,
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AFRL conducts technical review boards (TRB) and SRB in addition to documenting all
flight authorizations from AFRL and AFFTC. AFFTC responsibilities include reviewing
and approving test plans and safety plans in accordance with Federal Aviation
Regulations (FAR), Air Force Instructions (AFI), and AFMC and AFFTC supplements.
In the case of a flight mishap, AFFTC may provide assistance to the return to flight board
and assist in technical and safety reviews (AFMC/A3, 2006). More information on the
MOA between AFRL and AFFTC can be found in Appendix A.
Normally, a flight test process begins at the AFRL T&E Office, as shown in
Figure 2.1. The AFRL T&E Office accepts a flight test program from one of its
directorates and begins coordinating within AFRL. Following AFRL SRBs and TRBs,
the test package is submitted to the 412th OG for review. In almost all cases, the 412th OG
provides comments and questions concerning flight safety and operational
responsibilities and policies back to AFRL T&E Office for action. The review package
can include a test plan, safety plan, crew qualifications, results from AFRL SBR, and
flight authorizations. Comments and review procedures are usually handled over the
phone or through email due to the two geographically separated locations. This overall
process may take from three to six weeks for coordination to complete. Flight programs
that are assessed as medium to high risks may take longer due to higher safety and
technical requirements addressed by FAR, AFI, and AFFTC regulations.

9

Figure 2.1: AFRL and AFFTC Flight Test Approval Process
(445th Flight Test Squadron, 2008)

In addition to safety reviews from both AFRL and AFFTC, the PM is required to
submit a vehicle airworthiness application for flight operations in accordance with AFI
62-6 if the vehicle is to be flown outside restricted airspace. The airworthiness
determination is independent from the PM’s chain of execution. The Technical
Airworthiness Authority (TAA) is the authority to make these determinations for safe
flight operations and approve all certification basis documents and issue Military Type
Certificates (MTC) that prove the aircraft system type is in full compliance with the FAR.

2.1.1 Risk Assessment and Test Approval Authority
As determined by the MOA presented earlier, the Test Approving Authority
(TAA) from AFRL approves AFRL flight test programs while AFFTC approves the
AFRL programs through the FOA. The AFI and Air Force Flight Test Center Instructions
(AFFTCI) for flight tests mandate a higher authority review and approval for any
10

increase in risks. Per AFFTCI 91-5 and AFI 99-103, the signature authorities for low,
medium, and high risk test plans are detailed in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: AFFTC Signature Authority
(AFFTCI 91-5 AFFTC Test Safety Review Process)
ORGANIZATIONAL
LEVEL
Operations Group
Commander (OG/CC)
or equivalent
Test Wing Commander
(TW/CC) or equivalent
AFFTC Commander
(AFFTC/CC)

LOW RISK

HIGH RISK

Approve

MEDIUM
RISK
Coordinate

Information

Approve

Coordinate

Information

Information

Approve

Coordinate

Low risk test plans are approved by the 412th OG Commander (412 OG/CC) and
the owning AFRL Division Chief or their deputies before the start of any flight
operations. Medium risk test plans are jointly approved by the 412th Test Wing
Commander (412 TW/CC) and the owning AFRL Technical Directorate Director. High
risk test plans are jointly approved by the AFFTC Commander (AFFTC/CC) and the
AFRL Commander (AFRL/CC). All coordination comments between AFFTC and AFRL
must be resolved before a final approval for test execution. To avoid any duplicate
reviews, inspections, or evaluations by both organizations, an integrated test team
approach is used for conducting flight operations oversight.

2.1.2 Performance Gaps
Although instructions were provided by the AFRL T&E Office PMs on
procedural methods to conduct flight tests and flight approval process, most of the test
plans and safety plans are deemed inadequate by the AFRL T&E Office, which can be
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traced to the lack of flight test experience and details in the preparation of test plans.
Additional problems are caused because the majority of the PMs never sent initial
notifications of pending tests to the AFRL T&E office. In 2010, over 40 test plans were
submitted from different directorates to the AFRL T&E office, 90% of which were
deemed low risk status, but over 50% of the test plans submitted for coordination were
only given a three-week notice in a process that normally requires six months of lead
time (AFRL T&E Office, 2011).
Previous research efforts conducted by Homan, Parker, Wirthlin, and Pignatiello
(2011) found that the number of test plans submitted to AFFTC creates a potential major
work bottleneck at the FOA at Edwards AFB, who is also responsible for nine other local
test organizations. Moreover, these local flight tests are the FOA’s main duties at
Edwards AFB, and they do usually take precedence over approving AFRL flight test
programs. Another major problem is the workload and how it flows through the AFRL
approval process, thus further delaying the flow of the test plans. As seen in Figure 2.2,
members at the AFRL T&E Office handle numerous test plans per year submitted from
dozens of PMs from different AFRL directorates. These test plans are sometimes written
in non-standardized formats and are usually submitted late. This tardiness in most of the
test plans delays the AFRL T&E Office reviewing the test plans and hampers
coordinating with the members at AFFTC.
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Figure 2.2: AFRL and AFFTC Flight Approval Performance Analysis
(Modified from Homan et al., 2011)

In the case of a mishap, the return-to-flight process also uses the same test
approval process and is usually handled by the same members approving the original test
plans. Upon learning of a mishap, the AFRL T&E Office and the test team are required to
notify AFFTC of the mishap. To mitigate further risks, the test team is required to stop all
tests and file a report on the mishap, which takes more time and effort away from any
other on-going coordination with the AFRL T&E Office and AFFTC. The reporting
process begins when the mishap investigation is initiated by an integrated test team from
both AFRL and the test team. AFRL holds all accountability and investigation
responsibilities during the mishap. The 412th OG is the ground and return-to-fly approval
authority for mishaps that are considered Class A or Class B, which include permanent,
partial or total disability or property damage of $500,000 or more (AFMC/A3, 2006,
AFRLM 99-103).
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2.1.3 Improvement Initiatives
The performance gaps and issues presented earlier reveal a need for change in the
process, manpower, and resources for management and improvement. Collectively, there
is room for improvement on both sides of the process. Any new PM to the AFRL flight
test process would notice the work burden carried by the AFRL T&E Office; yet, there is
still another side to the issue, which is the work of approval authority at AFFTC. The
FOA at AFFTC is often times regarded as the single chokepoint and sometimes blamed
for the failure to deliver on-time approval of flight dates (Homan et al., 2011). Although
AFFTC’s main concern for AFRL flight test programs is the safe conduct of flight tests
in accordance with applicable AFFTC, FAA, and USAF instructions and their
supplements, their main duty lies with nine other local flight test organizations or
squadrons (Homan et al., 2011). Therefore, any quick reviews from AFFTC may
jeopardize the safety of the program.
Many discussions for improvements and exchange initiatives have been raised by
both sides to speed up the process, but few have come to full fruition (AFRL T&E Office,
2011). One of the initiatives that started from both sides of the process was an agreement
to draft an amendment to the original MOA to eliminate AFFTC oversight on low risk
programs and allow AFRL the authority to approve its own flight test programs without
full AFFTC involvement (AFMC/A3, 2006). This initiative was funneled up to
AFMC/A3 asking for AFRL to assume full approval authority and responsibility for all
low risk programs, with the 412th OG continuing to provide oversight for medium and
high risk programs as defined in the MOA. However, the initiative was quickly rejected
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at AFMC/A3 after weighing the risks and benefits of having no Operations Group
Commander oversight of an AFRL flight test program (HQ AFMC/A3F).

2.2 The Importance of Flight Tests
Flight testing in both piloted and unmanned aerospace vehicles is an ongoing
activity that pushes the limits of aeronautical and aerospace knowledge. The primary
purpose of flight testing, according to the AGARD Flight Test Manual (Perkins et al.,
1959), lists three fundamental reasons for flight testing:

1. To determine the actual characteristics of the machine.
2. To provide developmental information.
3. To obtain research information.

Although the reasons listed above do not specifically indicate that modern
aerospace vehicles require teams of engineers and scientists, whether piloted or
unmanned; they do, however, provide the classical reasons for conducing flight tests.
From this perspective, the true purpose of flight testing is to reduce future uncertainties in
the design and test processes before going to the operational stages and airworthiness
certifications. Flight testing also provides practical experiences to the operators and
involves interaction with other systems that increases interoperability (Williams &
Harris, 2002).
Recent advances in technologies and new procedures may have been successfully
integrated into the stages of aerospace development, but basic flight tests are required to
provide credibility, and these must be proven in the flight test environment including
piloted aircraft and UAVs. Additionally, the involvement of humans in UAV missions in
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flight tests ensures that the total UAV system functions correctly. Flight tests and
evaluations must also determine the suitability of the UAV system for use by the end
users, especially the operators and maintainers (Williams & Harris, 2002).
Historically, military systems have relied heavily on prototypes of airplanes to
provide valuable predictions for development efforts. Since the early 1970s, the YF-22
and YF-23, the YF-16 and YF-17, the YA-9 and YA-10, and the X-32 and X-35 efforts
were all head-to-head flight test comparisons of competing prototypes (Ward et al.,
2006). Prototyping does not always lead to production, but may instead lead to further
development of an existing design. Subsystems technology must also be proven in the
harsh flight environment (Ward et al., 2006). These subsystems include radar,
navigational systems, flight management systems, integrated displays, flight control
system, communication systems, etc.
According to the UAV Task Force Final Report (2004), unlike manned aircraft
which are integrated by a network communication with air traffic control (ATC), flight
management, and flight operation from various flight control operators, UAVs are
dependent on a network of remote systems and subsystems to make flight operations
possible. It is for this reason that testing and evaluation needs to be executed on the entire
system of the UAV and not on the vehicle alone. This could raise the magnitude of
testing a relatively uncomplicated SUAV to that of testing a highly complex integrated
system (Williams & Harris, 2002).
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2.3 Factors in Flight Testing
It takes thousands of man-hours and resources to build a new aircraft, but to get
certification to be airworthy for flights, every part of an aircraft has to meet standards set
out by the military and certifications required from the FAA. Testing a flight vehicle is a
complex process. It requires careful planning and measures of completeness and accuracy
in the data to be safe, within budget, and on time. In any form of tests, the most
significant cost for any program is the cost of safety. Therefore, almost all policies or
redundancies address safety concerns throughout the planning and conduct of any series
of flight tests. Ward, et al. (2006) discus the three primary factors in the test planning
process as the dominant concerns for all PMs and testers alike.

2.3.1 Safety
Every test carries some element of risk, whether it is a low, medium, or high risk
of a new prototype or determining the performance of a new piece of software on an
aircraft system. Risk elimination is a responsibility carried by all who are involved in
flight testing. Almost all flight test centers endorse a checklist approach toward safety
concerns based on the culmination of past experience and what seems to be the best
methodology in risk management. There is no single way to manage risk in engineering
processes; however, many flight test organizations (both government and industry) use a
standard set of procedures common to flight tests to manage risks. The following
summary is based on the AFFTC and NASA Procedures and Guidelines on T&E control
and conduct of risk assessment and risk mitigation (Ward et al., 2006). Most of the risk
management process includes the following steps:
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1.
2.
3.
4.

Hazard definition
Cause identification / Risk assessment
Risk mitigation
Emergency response

Test specific hazards are those that arise as a direct consequence of the test
activity. This step explores some of the “what if” questions that might increase the
probability of the hazard event occurring (Ward et al., 2006). Cause identification lists
the likelihood of occurrence ranging from improbable to frequent that the cause should
occur at least once. The severity of consequence of the cause ranges from negligible to
catastrophic, which includes injury and death. Table 2.2 shows an example of a matrix of
the hazard probability and its severity category.

Table 2.2: Example Risk Assessment Matrix
(AFFTCI 91-5 AFFTC Test Safety Review Process)
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Risk mitigation is the process by which risks are reduced, moving them down and
to the right in the risk assessment matrix (Ward et al., 2006). According to Ward et al.
(2006), reduction in the severity level usually requires specific hardware mitigations,
which are modifications to hardware to enhance the test safety; other reductions in the
severity level are procedural mitigations, which are intended to decrease the risk and the
likelihood of occurrence. Finally, every hazard analysis should include a procedural
response or corrective actions and some planning to address a mishap should it occur.

2.3.2 Cost
The cost of flight testing can range from tens of thousands to millions of dollars
depending on the scale and scope of each test. It is therefore up to the engineers and PMs
to consider the cost of each test to be conducted and analyzed whether the test is
manageable, and most importantly, why the test should be done. While this research does
not specifically focus on the factors of cost and the efficiencies of cost control and
visibility, it does, however, weigh the cost benefit and risk of not having SUAVs go
through the formal flight test approval process that larger manned aircraft do in the
USAF.
Support for flight tests should be kept as simple as possible and consistent with
the risk and complexity of the test. Sometimes, flight test support can be as simple as a
flight mechanic on the ground servicing the aircraft and as complex as linked telemetry
and continuous radio communication with all aircraft (Ward et al., 2006). Ignoring the
technical expertise on instrumentation can lead to incorrect data and retest, which would
add more cost to future tests. Finally, every second spent in the air must be used
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productively. PMs should keep a focus on combining series of tests together as often as
possible to reduce fuel costs. Productive flying time should be used wisely but also
provide sufficient time to check for adequate data collection and test parameters (Ward et
al., 2006).
Costs may increase if advanced instrumentation is involved. A SUAV may have
low manufacturing cost and is replaceable if damaged, but the sensor payload attached to
the SUAV may cost even greater than the SUAV itself. This huge gap in the costs
between the carrier and the payload is one of the challenges in the flight test community,
and SUAV regulators have yet to define a definite risk analysis to the payload should the
UAV experience a flight mishap.

2.3.3 Schedule
Time is money. Naturally, nearly all flight test programs have time and costs
among their prime targets or objectives. One of the biggest challenges PMs must face is
meeting the scheduled deadline. Flight certification and approvals usually take a while to
get approved (DoD OSD, 2009), so it is wise to plan ahead and schedule many months in
advance before any actual test is being done. A schedule slip can force an entire program
to be up for review or face cancellation. When time and costs are measured, performance
may be lost due to constraints in the cost and schedule. However, for other projects such
as life critical systems, quality in the performance would be the overriding criteria for
determining the value of the project (Ward et al., 2006). A major factor in meeting the
test schedule is how many test vehicles are allocated to the flight test program. Increasing
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the number of flights or the number of test vehicles may alleviate a schedule problem, but
it may not be the answer when costs are at a limit.

2.4 The Military Market
Recently, a market study released by Teal Group Corporation, an aerospace and
defense market analysis company, estimates that UAV spending will almost double over
the next decade from current worldwide UAV expenditures of $5.9 billion annually to
$12 billion, of which the U.S. will account for 77% of the worldwide R&D and T&E
spending on technology and about 69% on procurement (Teal Group Coorporation,
2009). Figure 2.3 shows that the U.S. will dwarf the rest of the world in UAV R&D
technology and procurement in the years ahead, followed by European and Asian-Pacific
countries.

Figure 2.3: Worldwide UAV Forecast
(Teal Group Corporation, COTS Journal Online, 2011)
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Today, over 30 countries are investing and developing sophisticated UAVs for
multiple purposes, including border patrol, global navigation, agricultural spraying, and
planting operations (De Garmo, 2004). The most significant part of the U.S. R&D and
procurement spending will be for the interests of the U.S. military. According to the
Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD), since the 1950s, the U.S.
military has spent more than $25 billion on UAV development. However, it has had
difficulty in setting priorities, determining missions, and developing UAV standards,
which has led to a number of programs being repeatedly modified, replaced, or cancelled
(De Garmo, 2004). Despite the difficulty in setting UAV standards, the U.S. DoD is
committed to setting the pace for UAV funding, research, and applications. In the last ten
years alone, the U.S. military has increased over ten-fold the annual funding for UAVs,
as shown in Figure 2.4. This figure is expected to keep rising, eclipsing robotic systems
among the DoD’s top procurement priorities (Sully, 2004).
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Figure 2.4: DoD Annual Funding Profiles for UAVs
(De Garmo, 2004)

2.5 Regulatory Requirements for SUAVs
With a handheld GPS and a keen interest in aerodynamics, hobbyists and infantry
alike are becoming attracted to SUAVs. SUAVs, normally powered by small electric or
gas turbine engines, are often considered a subclass of UAVs. These SUAVs are
becoming increasingly popular due to their sizes and simplicity in data fielding and
operation. Traditionally, UAVs are primarily used by the military, but demands for UAV
use have expanded to commercial and other governmental uses, which drives a
considerable need for UAV flight regulations and operational requirements. However,
because of the lack of airspace regulations and airworthiness and safety requirements,
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access to UAV applications still present a major barrier and challenges to other markets
other than the military (De Garmo, 2004).
An airworthiness certificate is an FAA document which grants authorization to
operate an aircraft in flight in compliance with the approved certification basis (FAA
Website, 2011). According to AFI 62-601, airworthiness is defined as the “verified and
documented capability of air system configuration to safely attain, sustain, and terminate
flight in accordance with approved usage and limits.” A generic airworthiness defines
whether an aircraft has been certified as suitable for safe flight without significant hazard
to aircrew, ground crew, passengers (if relevant), or to the general public over which such
airborne systems are flown.

2.5.1 Issues with Traditional Flight Test Methods for SUAVs
Not all R&D technology and procurement come without risks and mishaps.
According to the DoD’s Airspace Integration Plan for Unmanned Aviation (2004),
SUAVs have higher reported loss rates than manned aircraft, especially during takeoff
and landing. Because of the nature of UAVs being unmanned, their loss could sometimes
be regarded as acceptable in exchange for continuous data gathering and research efforts.
Due to the nature of UAVs and their systems, safety aspects have yet to be
defined and this leads to issues not normally considered for manned systems (EASA,
2004). According to Ostler (2006), traditional flight testing methods may not be suitable
for SUAVs for a number of reasons. First, in-flight engine power cannot be determined
by measuring fuel flow (i.e., electric engines). Second, SUAVs that are electrically
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powered do not decrease in weight over time as do conventional aircraft. Finally, data
acquisition systems in SUAVs are limited in size and weight.
Another area usually not considered in traditional flight test methods and the T&E
of SUAVs is wind tunnel testing and aerodynamic analysis support. Although wind
tunnel testing can provide data to predict and develop control surface designs, few SUAV
operators opt to utilize wind tunnel testing, as it is generally accepted that flight testing
out in the flight range is adequate enough and remains the most reliable method for
SUAVs (Williams & Harris, 2002). In addition to SUAV hardware and autonomous
system reliability, other flight test challenges include categorical flying qualities, flight
performance, and avionics evaluations. Provisions for these SUAV flight tests may not
completely follow conventional manned aircraft flight test techniques due to the nature of
UAV flight cues and their sensitivities due to of their small physical sizes and weights
(Williams & Harris, 2002).
Another area of concern is the required region of airspace possessing the
appropriate vertical and lateral limits to conduct flight testing of UAV systems (Williams
& Harris, 2002). This region of airspace should have few obstructions, such as powerlines, tall structures, and trees, and it should be located outside civil controlled airspace.
Some SUAVs are now able to execute tasks autonomously, such as takeoff and landing.
Unfortunately, the lack of UAV regulations has prevented these SUAVs from operating
in unrestricted airspace alongside manned aircraft (Ingham et al., 2006). Furthermore,
this restriction has more complications due to an unproven technical safety record where
the data cannot be collected until more UAVs can operate alongside manned aircraft,
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which results in a “chicken and egg” situation (Ingham, 2006; Kuke, 2004; De Garmo,
2004).

2.5.2 UAV Standards and Regulations in the National Air Space
Standards and regulations are part of the flight test process and requirements for
airworthiness. By definition, a standard is an accepted minimum requirement in which
compliance must be shown to achieve certification or qualification status (Ingham, 2008).
UAV standards are currently under development from the FAA for airworthiness
certifications. A regulation, such as the FAR, is a set of legislative prescriptions that must
be complied with prior to, as well as during, the operation of a UAV in the national
airspace (Ingham, 2008). Such regulations are also under development for civil UAV
flights in commercial airspace.
Although UAV markets for military and civil applications have been steadily
growing, the lack of regulatory framework in creating standards and regulations has been
evident. With new UAV technology, major flight test organizations including the FAA
must first determine the risks of any associated system failures before the new technology
is considered safe to be put into the National Airspace Systems (NAS) (Ingham, 2008).
Any unforeseen developments, technological improvements, and human factors play a
role in whether the new technology is safe enough to be permitted into the NAS. Once
the risks are addressed, flight safety and integration into the NAS are taken in stages,
similar to the developmental testing and operational testing and evaluation (DT&E,
OT&E) established by the DoD. The FAA is also using the same DT&E and OT&E
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methodology to manage the integration of the UAV technology into the NAS (Kalinowki,
2010).
Current recreational use of the NAS limits UAV operations to below 400 feet
above ground level and away from airports and air traffic (FAA Website, 2011). The
FAA’s main concern is not only that UAVs might interfere with commercial and general
aviation operations, but that they could also pose a safety problem for other airborne
vehicles and persons or property on the ground. Developing and implementing new UAV
standards and regulations is a long-term effort for the FAA, especially when there is little
data available to integrate UAVs safely and efficiently into the NAS. The FAA also
indicates that more safety data is needed before it can establish a decision to fully
integrate UAVs into the NAS, where the general aviation public travels each day (FAA
Factsheet, 2011).

2.6 Possible Airworthiness and Certification
The objective of UAV certification in an unrestricted airspace is to achieve “file
and fly” operations, but in order to achieve flight operations, flight tests will have to be
executed in order to prove compliance with relevant regulations and prove its
airworthiness (Ingham, 2008). Flight testing for airworthiness in SUAVs is sometimes
conducted to observe the usefulness of the latest developments for conventional aircraft.
For example, a new control law or a novel wing structure was tested using SUAVs in
aerial flight (Brinker, 2001; Murray, 2002). One of the major challenges in operating an
SUAV is the capability to detect and avoid aircraft and other objects while airborne.
Collision avoidance has become the most pressing concern, and is also the focus for
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many studies and research institutions worldwide, including AFRL with its Auto
Avoidance Collision System (De Garmo, 2004).
To avoid collisions with other aircraft, UAVs must have a “sense and avoid”
capability, which allows them to detect and safely stay clear of other aircraft and
obstructions midair (De Garmo, 2004). This development of “sense and avoid” capability
in UAVs has also provided significant benefits for both manned and unmanned operators
(Ingham et al., 2006). While UAV proponents view this new technology as promising,
the limited safety and operational data available does not support the full integration of
UAVs into the NAS (FAA Website, 2011).

2.6.1 Current Initiatives
All UAVs and manned aircraft in the NAS are regulated by the FAA under
jurisdiction granted by law (FAA, 2011). While it is unarguable that large and heavy
UAV airframes require an airworthiness certification, the question yet remains for
SUAVs that have wingspans measuring less than a few feet across and weighing less than
a hundred pounds. Do these SUAVs need the same airworthiness certification as those of
larger sized UAVs? Some UAV enthusiasts argue that if such regulations are mandated
on SUAVs to meet the same requirements for airworthiness certification, it would
negatively affect airframe vendors and the SUAV manufacturing industry (UAV
MarketSpace). A recent safety study for UAV operation in the NAS from MIT’s
International Center for Air Transportation (ICAT) (2005) concludes that “the results of
the safety analysis indicate that it may be possible to operate small UAVs with few
operational and size restrictions over the majority of the United States.”
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In response to the influx of SUAV airworthiness applications, the FAA has
developed a memorandum titled “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations in the U.S.
National Airspace System – Interim Operational Approval Guidance” for guidance of
UAVs in the NAS. The FAA is also moving forward with UAV regulations and
guidelines to minimize accidents and failures. Furthermore, the FAA is working with the
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) to develop technical UAV
standards. Mainly, RTCA will address two key questions on UAVs regarding their
handling of communication, command, and control, and how UAVs will “sense and
avoid” other aircraft. According to a statement by Kalinowski before the Committee on
Homeland Security (2010), these activities are targeted for completion before 2015.
Other countries are also publishing or have already published regulations for
SUAVs. The French Ministry of Defense has drafted UAV regulations which are being
used by other organizations as a guideline (Ingham, 2008). The Joint
JAA/EUROCONTROL Initiative on UAVs final report (2004) proposes fairness,
equivalence, accountability, and responsibility as guiding principles for integrating UAVs
operating in civil airspace. The report emphasizes the use of existing manned regulations
while recognizing the need to tailor and complement them when considering the specific
characteristic of UAV operations.
Other national and international agencies are also proposing standards to bring
UAV flight operations within the manned operational environment in conjunction with
the military and civil airspace. Some of these various government and industry initiatives
include: The Technical Analysis and Applications Center (TAAC), Joint Planning and
Development Office (JPDO) UAV National Task Force (UNTF), UAV National Industry
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Team (UNITE), American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) UAV Committee,
and many other agencies worldwide with the objective of developing and introducing
UAVs regulations in national and international airspace (De Garmo, 2004).
In response to the growth and development of SUAVs, most organizations have
already accepted a short cut by adopting manned aircraft regulations that are suitable for
UAV flight operations (Ingham, 2008; DoD OSD, 2004; Williams & Harris, 2002).
Different agencies or flight test organizations have different regulatory bodies that govern
their policies regarding SUAVs. Some agencies have proposed relaxed regulations
accordingly for academic institutions, research organizations, and UAV developmental
organizations that design and test UAVs provided that these UAVs do not pose a threat to
people and property on the ground (Ingham et al., 2006). For example, light UAVs
weighing less than 150 kg with a kinetic energy of less than 95 kJ might not be required
to be certified, provided that they will operate as radio controlled aircraft within the
operator’s visual range in unrestricted airspace for missions such as telemetry and aerial
photography. However, larger UAVs weighing more than 150 kg with a kinetic energy of
more than 95 kJ and light UAVs flying in unrestricted airspace or outside the visual range
of the operator will be required to be flight tested and approved in a similar manner to
that of manned aircraft (CASR 1998, 2001).
Other approaches to airworthiness and certification of SUAVs include the
adaptation of a “safety target” from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
Under this approach, the overall objective of the UAV is within the context of a defined
mission and operating environment (EASA, 2004). The Safety Target approach is utilized
when UAV operators are under the direct control of a single authority, which has
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complete responsibility for safety, and is also the sole “customer.” EASA argues that
“this direct control of operations is a significant advantage when accepting a safety case
which relies upon the restriction of operations to compensate for uncertainties over
airworthiness” (EASA, 2004).

2.6.2 DoD Initiatives
As more UAV flight tests are being conducted by the USAF, military standards
have become restrictive regarding the safety and responsibility of the UAV programs,
resulting in excessive costs in manpower and delays in schedule (Ingham et al., 2006).
According to Ingham, et al. (2006), these same restrictions have often excluded suitable
suppliers because of their non-compliance with such specifications, regardless of the
rapid growth in the number of companies with high interests in the UAV business (Teal
Group Corporation, 2011).
In 1999, the DoD, working with the FAA, developed a flight approval process
known as a Certificate of Authorization (COA) contained in FAA Order 7610.4, Military
Operations, that permitted UAVs to operate in the National Airspace Systems (NAS) (De
Garmo, 2004). According to the FAA Factsheet (2011), the FAA issues a COA based on
the following principles:

1. The COA authorizes an operator to use defined airspace and includes
special provisions unique to each operation. For instance, a COA may
include a requirement to operate only under Visual Flight Rules (VFR)
and/or during daylight hours. Most COAs are issued for a specified time
period (up to one year, in most cases).
2. Most, if not all, COAs require coordination with an appropriate air traffic
control facility and may require the UAS to have a transponder to operate
in certain types of airspace.
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3. Due to the UASs inability to comply with ”sense and avoid” rules, a
ground observer or an accompanying “chase” aircraft must maintain
visual contact with the UAS and serve as its “eyes” when operating
outside of airspace that is restricted from other users.

According to De Garmo (2004) and FAA regulations, this process requires a caseby-case safety evaluation of each flight, which results in a lengthy process that can take
up to three months to approve depending on the FAA region or regions where the UAV
will be flown. Part of the approval process requires the FAA to issue a time and route of
the UAV flight to avoid risks to other aircraft and persons in the area, which further
limits the utility and missions of UAVs. The process is incapable of sustaining the high
volume of UAV flight requests (De Garmo, 2004). The FAA recognizes that the
processes is lengthy and has taken steps to streamline the process by standardizing the
review process and increasing communication and transparency between the agency and
the applicants (Kalinowski, 2010). Normally, COAs are worked on a first-come, firstserved basis, with the exception of emergency and disaster situations where the use of
UAVs warrants humanitarian needs.

2.7 Summary
This chapter detailed the importance of flight tests and the critical factors in flight
testing. There is an abundance of literature on proposals for UAV regulations and safety
standards, and this chapter briefly discussed the current initiatives carried out by the FAA
and other agencies in promoting UAV technology in the common airspace. However,
additional UAV data and flight requirements are needed to reach a decision for UAVs to
fly in the commercial airspace. With an understanding of the complications of SUAV
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flight test requirements and the background in the MOA between AFRL and AFFTC, it is
clear that additional studies are necessary to evaluate the process and determine the
benefits of additional safety reviews and the costs associated with it. The literature is
silent on this subject and forms the basis of this research.
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III. Methodology

This chapter reviews the methodology used in this research. The primary purpose
of the methodology is to establish a quantitative and qualitative measure of benefit for an
abbreviated flight test process for SUAVs based on the MOA between AFRL and
AFFTC. This research’s methodology uses interviews, cost sensitivity analysis, and
variability analysis using value stream mapping (VSM) techniques in the SUAV flight
testing processes for the development of a notional decision rule matrix. This chapter also
discusses the development of acceptable cost and optimal risk and the boundaries drawn
from analysis to construct a decision rule.

3.1 Research Design
This research is exploratory in nature using multidisciplinary approaches and
techniques, both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative research describes phenomena
in numbers and measures instead of words; the focus of the research is usually
predetermined and deducted from prior research (Krathwohl, 1998). Qualitative research,
on the other hand, describes phenomena in words instead of numbers or measures and
usually uses induction to ascertain what is important in the phenomena (Krathwohl,
1998).
By leveraging these multidisciplinary techniques (qualitative cost-benefit
analysis, interviews, cost sensitivity, variability analysis, and heuristic risk analysis), this
research will evaluate and quantify the current process used in the AFFTC review process
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and create a decision rule for future test flights. Figure 3.1 shows an outline of this
research’s methodology, which will be discussed in detail.

Figure 3.1: Research Methodology Overview

The use of these techniques, both quantitative and qualitative, offers a decisiondriven instead of hypothesis-driven methodology. A decision-driven methodology is
intended to facilitate making a decision about the applicability or worth of the process in
a given situation (Krathwohl, 1998). Such applicability to this situation may include the
total cost of the SUAV, its total impact energy, and weight of the vehicle. This overall
heuristic evaluation should offer the desired consensus or accepted basis for decision
making. For example, if the cost of the SUAV is less than that of the total cost the test,
then it may be necessary to reevaluate the total cost of the joint AFRL/AFFTC approval
process. Adversely, if the cost of the UAV is greater than that of the total cost of the
flight test process and execution, then the approval process is likely justified for greater
accountability and safety reviews. This approach may prove to be useful when comparing
the current UAV flight approval process to an abbreviated process.

3.2 Qualitative Cost-Benefit Analysis
A qualitative cost-benefit analysis is defined as the determination of the costs of
achieving certain benefits (Krathwohl, 1998). Cost-benefit analysis methodologies have
been used for multiple purposes in many different studies; its outcomes must be
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translated into monetary or other measure of value so their relation to costs may be
determined (Krathwohl, 1998). For a cost-benefit analysis conducted in this research, the
benefit may be in the form of cost and time savings from an abbreviated flight test
process.
According to Krathwohl (1998), cost-benefit analyses are often greatly affected
by the assumptions of difficult-to-estimate indirect costs and outcomes, such as the
personnel costs of individuals with different levels of qualifications. By measuring
outcomes across different programs according to the magnitude of their effects relative to
their costs in comparable terms, cost-effectiveness analysis allows a comparison of
choices of achieving certain benefits in relation to other methods of obtaining the same
benefits (Krathwohl, 1998; Rossi & Freeman, 1985).

3.2.1 Criteria Development and Assumptions for Cost-Benefit Analysis
In order to quantify the current process used by the USAF per the MOA between
AFRL and AFFTC, a VSM of the flight test approval process is reused from a lean
process improvement study conducted by Homan and colleagues (2011), as shown in
Appendix B. To ensure this research quantifies the standard USAF flight test process and
any abbreviated flight test process for SUAVs, a comprehensive holistic assumption was
required for the comparison of both processes. It is assumed that all work has a valueadded and a non-valued-added component to it. First, any value-added (VA) work
identified in resources and manpower is assumed to be valid—that an average hourly rate
and time per person reviewing the flight test program was standard across all
organizations. Second, any non-value-added (NVA) work time and resources consists of
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waste and necessary waste, which include policy, regulations, and standard processing
time. Non-value-added “pure waste” consists of the “cost of delays,” in which man-hours
were considered “lost” due to queuing effects in the approval process and doing “no
work” while waiting.
Furthermore, other assumptions in the data gathering of this study include the
value-added work in terms of resources and manpower for SUAV programs and those of
larger manned aircraft are likely to be different from each other. It was assumed that
SUAV programs do not require as much resources and manpower as those of larger
manned aircraft programs. Another assumption is that system complexity and safety
guidelines of both types of vehicles are assumed to be different due to the nature of
manned versus unmanned aircraft (i.e., manned vehicles are more complex and require a
higher standard of safety guidelines than SUAVs). Lastly, the risk assessment and
management of both classes of vehicles are also assumed to be different—that SUAVs
are sometimes expendable because of their low manufacturing and operating costs when
compared to larger conventional aircraft.

3.2.2 Notional Balance Statement
By using the criteria for qualitative cost-benefit analysis and the comprehensive
assumptions, a notional overall breakdown of the total cost of flight testing a SUAV is
proposed in Table 3.1. The total cost of a SUAV flight test includes the costs of
approving flight status from both organizations (AFRL and AFFTC) and the cost of test
execution.
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Table 3.1: Notional SUAV Flight Test Balance Statement
SUAV Program Asset Cost
Test Execution Cost
AFRL Review Cost
AFRL Risk Abatement Cost
Value Added Work
Non-value Added Work
Waste
Necessary Waste
AFFTC Review Cost
AFFTC Risk Abatement Cost
Value Added Work
Non-value Added Work
Waste
Necessary Waste
Total SUAV Asset and Liabilities

This flight test approval process can be summarized in its most basic and simple
balance statement equation based on the assumptions and criteria discussed earlier:

TestTotal Cost = AFRLReview Cost + AFFTCReview Cost + TEcost, where,
AFRLReview Cost = AFRLRAC + VA + NVA
AFFTCReview Cost = AFFTCRAC + VA + NVA
The Test Total Cost is the total cost of the test. The Review Costs at AFRL and AFFTC
include the Risk Abatement Cost (RAC) and the value-added (VA) and non-value-added
(NVA) costs. The Risk Abatement Cost (RAC) represents the safety and technical reviews
performed by the approving authority at AFRL and AFFTC prior to test execution. The
respective VA and NVA costs at AFRL and AFFTC are directly and indirectly incurred
from both organizations as part of approving process per regulations and policy, based on
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their respective resources and manpower. Next, TEcost is the cost of test execution, which
is the operating cost to fly the SUAV. Finally, the SUAV Asset Cost consists of the
vehicle platform cost and the payload cost. However, for cost simplicity, this research
will not differentiate between these two costs but assumes they are a single asset cost.
The basic notional balance statement sheet presented may be elementary, as it
only shows a very generic cost to the total SUAV flight test operation. Additionally,
when comparing the two balance statements, one with AFFTC risk abatement cost and
the other without AFFTC risk abatement cost, the PM would choose the lesser of the two
for cost and schedule savings. However, further analysis in risk assessment, data
variability, and cost sensibility may call into question this simple approach.

3.2.3 Interviews
The qualitative cost-benefit analysis for this study will be coupled with insights
from qualitative interviews in order to elicit the processing costs of an abbreviated
process. It is assumed that the cost-benefit analysis requires personal interviews for data
validation and strengthening the results. Interviews are one qualitative research
methodology that allows the interviewer to gain a depth of responses from individuals in
the process, yet it has its own disadvantages. Interview responses are often reflected by
individual biases, and may also be in a form of confidentiality unbeknownst to the
interviewer (Krathwohl, 1998). These responses may be difficult to analyze due to the
sensitivity of the subject and the predisposition of individuals to respond a certain way.
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3.2.4 Cost Sensitivity
Cost sensitivity measures how variations in the overall [SUAV] configuration
affect the resource requirements and costs (Tenzer, 1965). As discussed earlier, there are
always some forms of uncertainties and risks involve in flight testing, especially to
SUAVs when its total cost is sensitive to its payload. One way to measure cost sensitivity
is the design and operational parameters of the SUAV. The total flight test costs may
greatly increase if an advanced sensor payload is attached to the SUAV, which may also
significantly increase the risk factor and the costs associated with the whole program.
Another way to look at cost sensitivity is the question of necessity in redundant reviews
for SUAVs. SUAV flight parameters and their associated costs may be the driving factor
in adding the flight approval review times, as these reviews may cause delays to the
programs. To an extent, any changes in the associated costs of the program are sensitive
to the decision rule used.

3.3 Data Variability Analysis
In addition to the qualitative cost-benefit analysis, personal interviews, and cost
sensitivity analysis, data variability obtained using the VSM will be analyzed. A VSM is
one the first products created when attempting a process improvement as described by
Womack and Jones (2003). McManus (2005) states that a VSM is a tool for achieving an
efficient process, and that its sole purpose is for process improvement by evaluating the
process holistically. The goal of the VSM is to depict material and information flows
across and throughout all the value-adding and non-value adding (waste) processes
required to produce the product (i.e., approval status) and deliver it to the customer (i.e.,
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the program manager and test team) (McManus & Millard, 2003). Therefore, the VSM is
an appropriate approach due to its “all-in-one” top-level picture of all the processes that
occur in the flight approval process, from the time a test plan is submitted to the time it is
approved for flight status.
In a perfect process, every link in the approval chain should be synchronized,
making the approval system as lean as possible. However, achieving a high level of
synchronization requires a “smooth flow” process (Murman, 2002). The current flight
test approval process involves moderate to high variability in the value flow streams, as
organizations have variable flight test demands at different times and resources to
approve fight tests. According to Oehmen and Rebentisch (2010), variability in process
execution leads to widely varying process times and thus a low degree of
synchronization. Oehmen and Rebentisch (2010) also argue that over utilized capacities
(e.g., engineers) can also be a cause for such variations, as these disturbances cannot be
buffered and immediately lead to delays.
One of the purposes of VSM is to identify and predict locations of process
variability. If variability cannot be controlled due to budget or schedule constraints in the
program, then there should be enough takt time in the individual process steps so the end
step in the process will not have high variability. Takt time is the number of units of work
demanded by the customer divided by the available time (McManus, 2005); for this
research effort, it is the number of days needed for a completed test plan review to get
approved for flight test. According to McManus (2005), the single most important
concept of lean product development is achieving a takt time, and that all tasks or steps in
the process must then proceed at this pace.
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For example, if the FOA’s average rate for approving a test plan is three days,
then the takt time at the FOA step is three even if the actual data varies with the
workload. The FOA must be able to support this average takt time of three days per test
plan review, or the overall demand for work cannot be met, which would trigger
bottlenecks and delays in the downstream processes. In summary, in an uncontrolled
process with variations of any sort, queuing effects will tend to build delays between
process steps and pile up work at bottlenecks (McManus, 2005).

3.4 Managing Acceptable Cost and Optimal Risk
Many in the T&E community know the risk hazards present in the
operation of any complex system, manned and unmanned systems included. This concern
is probably one of the major reasons why UAV standards and regulations are being
worked throughout many organizations in the development of UAV safety and
airworthiness certification. Based on data from the T&E community, especially those
coming from the military, UAVs have a poor safety record (De Garmo, 2004). According
to an April 2003 Congressional Research Service report, the UAV accident rate is 100
times that of manned aircraft (Bone & Bolkcom, 2003). Another study conducted by the
USAF in 2002 concluded that the accident rate for UAVs is 50 times greater than that of
an F-16 fighter jet (De Garmo, 2004).
A more recent 2009 DoD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap determined
that UAVs have suffered mishaps at one to two orders of magnitude greater than the rate
(per 100,000 hours) incurred by manned military aircraft. Figure 3.2 shows the mishap
rates per 100,000 flight hours between manned and unmanned vehicles between 1986 to
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2006. Notice that SUAVs such as the Hunter, Shadow, and Pioneer, whose wingspans
and body lengths have an average from 10 feet to 20 feet, have higher mishap rates
compared to those of other types of vehicles. Also noted is the decrease in mishaps as
these SUAVs accumulate more flight hours. The decrease in SUAV mishaps shown in
Figure 3.2 represents a steep learning curve from SUAVs as the technology matures.

Figure 3.2: U.S. Military Aircraft and UAV Class A Mishap Rates
(DoD FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, 2009)

It is for this very reason of UAV mishap rates that PMs and UAV operators
should carefully manage the cost of these SUAVs and reduce the risk to an optimal level
necessary for the continuation of flight tests in the program. As clearly stated in the
previous chapter (Chapter 2: Literature Review), the primary goal of any flight approval
process for airworthiness and flight certification is to reduce risks and increase safety
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standards among SUAVs and other airborne vehicles, including those who flight test
them. While it has always been the PM’s goal to reduce the costs in UAV flight
operations and any overhead costs incurred while waiting for the flight approval process,
the cost of risk abatement in time and resources is almost always never explicitly
managed. However, with limited resources and time, the question becomes, “How much
risk abatement is enough as part of the flight test approval process?” Figure 3.3 shows a
classical answer from economics where the optimal level of risk is where the sum of the
cost of risk abatement and the expected losses from risk is at a minimum (Morgan, 1981).

Figure 3.3: Managing Cost and Level of Risk
(Morgan, 1981)

Two of the most common forms of risks are “acceptable risk” and “optimal risk.”
(Morgan, 1981). Acceptable risk implies a predetermined criterion or standard for a
maximum risk threshold level below which risk will be tolerated, and thereby permits the
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evaluation of cost, national priority interests, and number of tests to be conducted (U.S.
Army White Sands Missile Range, Morgan). Optimal risk implies a trade-off that
minimizes the sum of all undesirable consequences (Morgan, 1981). It is this optimality
that justifies careful attention, thus the basis of this research in terms of an abbreviated
approval process for SUAVs where redundancy in the cost of risk abatement may be
unnecessary.
One way to reduce the cost of risk abatement is to actually reduce its cost by
shortening some of the safety review times. However, reducing the cost of risk abatement
in this way would likely increase the level of risks and the expected losses from risk,
resulting in an increase to the total cost of the program because of the accompanying
reduction in scrutiny of the safety review. Therefore, the primary method used in this
study is to determine the cost benefit of an abbreviated flight test to achieve an optimal
level of risk. This optimal level of risk should demonstrate an appropriate reduction in the
cost of risk abatement while maintaining or decreasing the expected losses from risk, thus
minimizing the total costs incurred from the flight approval process and UAV operation.
In investigating the notional optimal level of risk, this study proposes shifting the total
cost curve and the cost of risk abatement curve to the left, as seen in Figure 3.4.
If a reduction in the cost of risk abatement is attainable, either through eliminating
AFFTC reviews or decreasing the complexity of the vehicle, the abbreviated approval
process may reveal that it can be condensed and shortened with probable cost savings to
the total cost and expected losses from risk. Various features in the flight test approval
process can be factored in when deciding how much risk abatement, or for the purposes
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of this research, the degree to which safety reviews are modulated in the process to save
time and money.

Figure 3.4: Notional Optimal Level of Risk

3.5 Summary
This chapter has detailed the methodology used in this study. The notional flight
test balance sheet with proposed assumptions tailored by interviews and cost sensitivity
analysis establish the conditions needed to create a better understanding of the costs
associated with the flight test approval process. Furthermore, data variability analysis will
be used to present a thorough overview of the current process depicted in the VSM and
the issues that arise from it. Additionally, by combining the balance sheet and the
analyses, this methodology seeks to expose the advantages and disadvantages of flight
test process steps in the overall chain of reviews and approvals. Finally, this chapter
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notionally identified the costs of risk abatement and the expected losses due to SUAV
flight tests. The results and analysis using this methodology are presented in Chapter 4.
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IV. Results and Analysis

This chapter describes the results and analysis of the data gathered from the flight
test offices. The first section details the flight test balance statement with relevant
assumptions in operational and personnel costs to determine the cost-benefit of the
review process at AFFTC. The second section focuses on VSM analysis of cost
sensitivity and time variability in the chain of approval process through a Variability
Simulator. Next, the analysis on risk management with acceptable risk to costs and
optimal risk in flight testing are shown. These cost benefits are then measured against the
cost of risk abatement and expected losses to the UAV to determine the threshold where
it makes sense that the review process at AFFTC adds value.

4.1 Cost Measurement Analysis
Cost measurements are taken from labor hours and costs of operating and
maintaining a SUAV. The intention of this analysis is to determine whether the extra
reviewing and approval process at AFFTC is needed from the point of view of a
simplistic SUAV flight test. These costs were taken from historical data and labor hours
were assumed based on the rank and pay grade of the officer in charge of certain
processes. Comparisons were made with significant assumptions due to the sensitivity of
the SUAV costs and the difficult-to-estimate indirect costs. Nevertheless, the balance
statement in the cost measurement analysis shows the financial resources available so that
PMs may decide how to use cost information in the assessment of economic alternatives.
It may sound elementary that the lower cost in the balance statement will most likely be
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chosen, but it may be apparent that there are several other issues and problems that must
be dealt with in order to develop further analysis for cost benefits.

4.1.1 Estimated Cost Balance Statement
Historical data from 2011 shows 22 different SUAV tests within the continental
United States, averaging $66,500 in costs per vehicle. Each program had an average of
two SUAVs produced and flown during the life of the program, which can be added up to
a total of $133,000 in SUAV program assets. Each SUAV also had an average of 23.8
sorties and 9.9 flight hours (see Appendix C for SUAV costs and mishap data). The test
execution cost, estimated at $30,000, was based off of the average range cost, fuel cost,
and any extra burden and overhead costs including personnel involved in the flight test of
the SUAV. The following processing days were taken from the current VSM flight test
process (Appendix B) developed by Homan et al. (2011) and the AFRL T&E Office
(Appendix C) to determine a conservative estimated cost of the review process.
The AFRL technical and safety reviews (TRB & SRB) typically took four to five
weeks (25 working days) prior to the actual test execution; therefore, it was possible to
estimate the value-added (VA) time and costs of the review process. With a conservative
assumption of a four-member team including those at the AFRL T&E Office working 25
working days and one Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) or a GS-15 pay grade technical lead
working two (2) days, the total TRB and SRB cost averaged $20,000. Since AFFTC does
not normally take part in the TRB and SBR at AFRL for low risk test plans, this value
was low; but nevertheless, an estimate of one (1) working day was added for any
comments provided from the FOA to the AFRL TRB and SRB.
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Next, the non-value added (NVA) work (waste and necessary waste) both at
AFRL and AFFTC were greatly assumed as standard processing time with delays. These
delays can sometimes be considered as buffer times or variations against uncertainties in
the overall process. The assumption on AFRL waste and necessary waste was one (1) and
two (2) working days, respectively. AFFTC’s non-value added waste work was assumed
to be two (2) working days.
Finally, the AFRL risk abatement cost (AFRLRAC) was also based on an average
O-5 or a GS-15 pay grade combined with the current five (5) working days to approve a
flight test at AFRL per the VSM. Likewise with AFFTC risk abatement cost
(AFFTCRAC), except the current average processing time to approve an AFRL flight test
at AFFTC was six (6) working days, which was based off of the data provided by the
AFRL T&E Office. When combining all of this data together, the total average SUAV
asset and liability has a total cost of $191,500.
Table 4.1 summarizes the value-added (VA) time required at critical steps through
the flight approval process. The first step requires the PM to meet with the AFRL T&E
Office to conduct TRB and SRB and document mishap reporting procedures in the test
plan—all of which happen four to five weeks prior to test execution. The second step
requires the AFRL Technical Director Division Chief’s (GS-15) review and approval to
start test, which normally takes five (5) working days. The third step, which is in
conjunction with the second step, requires the FOA at AFFTC to review and approve the
test plan in order to start the flight test, which averages six (6) working days. Table 4.2
shows the balance statement of an average typical SUAV flight test.
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Table 4.1: Estimated Time for AFRL/AFFTC Approval Review
Process Step

AFRL Processing
Time (Work days)

PM meets with AFRL
T&E Office to conduct 4 members take 25 WD
TRB & SRB and
1 O-5/GS-15 take 2 WD
finalizes test plan
Get AFRL Division
Chief (GS-15) to review 1 O-5/GS-15 take 5 WD
and approve to start test
Get AFFTC FOA (O-5)
to review and approve to
n/a
start test

AFFTC Processing
Time (Work days)
1 O-5/GS-15 take 1 WD

n/a

1 O-5/GS-15 take 6 WD

Table 4.2: Notional SUAV Cost Balance Statement
SUAV Program Asset Cost
Test Execution Cost
AFRL Review Cost
AFRL Risk Abatement Cost
Value Added Work
Non-value Added Work
Waste
Necessary Waste
AFFTC Review Cost
AFRL Risk Abatement Cost
Value Added Work
Non-value Added Work
Waste
Necessary Waste
Total SUAV Asset and Liabilities

$133,000
$30,000
$2,100
$20,000
$1,200
$1,500
$2,500
$400
$800
$0
$191,500

TestTotal Cost = AFRLReview Cost + AFFTCReview Cost + TEcost
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4.1.2 Initial Cost Results
As previously emphasized, it is important to recognize that these monetary values
are presented with significant assumptions based on empirical observations of only
somewhat similar situations befitting an exploratory research such as this. From the data
presented, with an average total value of $191,500 in SUAV asset and liabilities, the total
AFFTC review costs ($3,700) did not represent any substantial impact to the total value
of the SUAV. Not only was the AFFTC review cost less than anticipated, the average
reviewing time was much shorter than previously expected.
With regards to flight mishap data from the AFRL T&E Office (Appendix C),
SUAV flights from 2011 had nine flights mishaps with a total of over $625,000 in
damages, which translated into an average of $69,400 per flight mishap. Additionally,
data from the AFRL T&E Office showed an average of five (5) working days for a return
to flight approval from AFFTC upon learning of a mishap. In two mishap instances, the
return to flight processing time AFFTC took to approve was three working days and six
working days, respectively. By using similar assumptions and estimates on cost, these
five working days had an estimated process cost of a little over $2,000 for a return to
flight approval from AFFTC. Again, the average time and cost of a return to flight
approval from AFFTC was insignificant compared to the total cost in mishap damages.
In summary, the cost measurement analysis from the data given suggested that the
process time and process cost from the AFFTC review was considerably less than
previously expected. Moreover, the time to approve a return to flight following a mishap
was reasonably less in terms of cost and time. This initial cost analysis shows that the
AFFTC involvement in AFRL flight tests may be beneficial and instrumental in
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mitigating AFRL flight mishaps, considering SUAV flight tests in 2011 had experienced
a mishap with over $69,000 in damages for each mishap. The extra review at the AFFTC
may cause additional time and overhead costs for the test management organization, but
in the long run, it may be valuable in providing comments and insights to the PMs and
the test teams at AFRL, thereby possibly reducing future flight mishaps. This perceived
value of extra small dollars and time to “buy” a decreased chance of failure may be
enough to convince the PMs to spend the additional funds to mitigate mishaps. However,
given the nature of R&D in UAV test flights, mishaps that cost a few hundred to a few
thousand dollars are sometimes considered negligible and acceptable in favor of
improved research.
Additional interviews were conducted with the AFRL T&E Office as more details
on AFFTC review process were revealed. One of the primary reasons why the approval
processing time from AFFTC was cut shorter than what was anticipated at the beginning
of this research was the personnel changes that took place in the 412th OG at AFFTC
since the Homan et al. (2011) study. Personnel at the AFRL T&E Office noticed the trend
in approval review was slashed to almost half that from previous submissions. The AFRL
T&E Office also noticed there were no additional re-work or additional value added
feedback from the FOA. This decreasing trend in approval time and the lack of in-depth
reviews from AFFTC suggested either an absence of interest in SUAV flight test reviews
from the new personnel, or that the new FOA has come to fully trust the flight test
organizations at AFRL with simple SUAV tests and designs. In addition to the new FOA
personnel at AFFTC, the AFRL T&E Office also welcomed in a new Chief, who is a Test
Pilot School (TPS) graduate from Edwards AFB. Both organizations have seen an
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increase in direct communication on issues relating to SUAV tests. Perhaps the
experienced TPS graduate and new Chief at the AFRL T&E Office brings new skills or
“value-added” to the process, hence the decreased time in the approval process.

4.1.3 Cost Sensitivity Results
There is difficulty in estimating cost evaluations, especially given sensitivities
associated with the programs. These sensitivities include the design and operational
parameters of the SUAVs. As shown in Figure 4.1, of the 22 SUAV flight test programs
in 2011, nearly half were new and prototypes with variable costs to each program, none
of which are dependent on their system maturity.

Figure 4.1: System Maturity vs. Cost

Figure 4.1 also shows that costs are not sensitive to system maturity, but rather to
the payloads carried by these SUAVs. The cost of some of these SUAVs can be high,
mostly due to their expensive payloads such as radar sensors and imaging capabilities.
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Since the initial results and mishap data have shown high vulnerability for SUAV
mishaps at an average of $69,400 in losses, PMs and test teams are recommended to have
initial estimates on the program’s feasibility and categorize test requirements in phases of
testing in order to reduce risks to program cost. These phases of testing and development
should be separated into a list of “must haves” and “good to haves” with user
prioritization that can be used to conduct trade-off at later stages of acquisition
development. These phases of testing and development should minimize cost
uncertainties, whereas an “all-in-one” package (i.e., one expensive payload on a SUAV)
may present a higher risk to cost should a mishap occur. This recommendation is in
agreement with the industrial practice of involving customers early in program
requirements with clear communication to separate their needs into “must haves” and a
“wish list” (CNSTAT et al., 2011). CNSTAT et al. (2011) also recognizes some
flexibility that allows for modifications responsive to users’ needs and changing
environments. However, any changes to program requirements can result in considerable
cost increases and schedule delays.
A substantial part of the many levels of safety reviews in the USAF is the
structure of accountability in the design and development of the system. A system that
has mature technologies will likely experience safer operation than those that have
immature systems. With SUAV payload costs that sometimes exceed the cost of the
vehicle, it becomes a question of technology maturity of the SUAV itself. Technology
immaturity such as those of SUAVs coupled with an expensive payload will certainly
cause scrutiny in reviews. According to CNSTAT et al. (2011), technology immaturity is
known to be a primary cause of schedule slippage and cost growth in DoD program
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acquisition. The success of a system maturity strategy depends on the consistent and
continuous definition of requirements and the maturation of technologies. This
“evolutionary acquisition” or a spiral acquisition approach to transition new technology
to operational capability is reflected in the DoD Instruction 5000.2. The objective of
evolutionary acquisition is to balance the needs and available capability with resources,
and to put capability into the hands of the user quickly (DoD AT&L).
In summary, system maturity costs were varied with SUAV performance and
payload cost. To minimize large mishap costs, a priority list of “must haves” and “good
to haves” should be implemented and decided on what and when to test first instead of
putting all eggs in one basket and risk it all from system failure.

4.2 Value Stream Mapping Analysis
Value Stream Mapping (VSM) examines the business process and seeks to
understand and improve such efforts. While this study does not focus on the efficiency of
the process, it does examine the necessity of the extra reviews at AFFTC and the cost
benefit of having such reviews. As Homan et al. (2011) described in the present-state
VSM, it was apparent that one of the larger areas of waste was the specific loops between
the different stakeholders (i.e., program managers) and the AFRL T&E Office. Other
problems revealed by Homan et al. (2011) included the lack of initial notifications of
pending tests and the absence of standardization in the test plans when submitted for
approval. The five main problems identified by Homan (2011) were:

1. Late notification and/or non-standard work (test plans or safety packages)
by PMs
2. Firefighting and heroics by AFRL T&E Office
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3. Bottleneck at FOA (high throughput and low capacity)
4. Lack of expected target timeline and non-standard work (mishap report)
for return-to-flight process
5. Lack of transparency throughout processes for all stakeholders

In quantifying the present-state VSM and the cost measurements which were
discussed in the previous result, initial data suggested that AFFTC involvement in AFRL
flight tests may be beneficial in providing feedback and mitigating mishaps given that the
costs and time required were miniscule compared to the total cost of the UAV program.
However, further analysis was needed to verify and determine the threshold at which
AFFTC involvement in low risk test plans adds value and that the extra review is
desirable even though it presents a fairly minimal investment in time and cost to the
program. Conversely, this threshold will also need to show that AFFTC’s involvement in
low cost programs are sometimes inapplicable because of SUAV costs and complexity,
and any program that falls below this threshold may not require additional reviews at
AFFTC.

4.2.1 Data Variability
In this portion of the analysis, a Variation Simulator developed by the Lean
Advancement Institute (LAI) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lean
Academy was used to measure the impacts of variation on cycle time in the approval
process. The intention of the variability simulation is to assess the impact that variability
has on process performance. Any variability in the simulation value is used for the
purpose of predicting relative differences in task execution at a particular step. Such
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simulation is not designed to cast judgment or predict performance at AFFTC or AFRL
T&E Office.
Reducing process variation is a key component in process improvement
methodologies such as lean Six Sigma. In an ideal process flow, where the input rate is
equal to or less than that of the output rate at every task, the flow should not experience
any delays and the process is deemed fully utilized. However, when variations in the
process are considered, the process begins to experience delays and work begins to
accumulate at various tasks. For the sake of simplicity, the process flow begins when the
PM submits a draft test plan to the AFRL T&E Office, which then begins the safety and
technical coordination approval process internally at AFRL and externally at AFFTC.
Once the approval process is complete, test execution can begin.
As demonstrated in Figure 4.2, the simulation assumed no output rate variations at
the AFRL T&E Office nor the review authority panels; however, the PM station had
variations per day in submitting test plans to the AFRL T&E Office. These test plans
were varied from one to five per day, which could represent a lack of notifications of
pending tests and lack of standardization in the test plans. These variations coming from
the PM had the most direct impact on the AFRL T&E Office. Hence, the workload
depicted in Figure 4.2 shows the accumulated test plans at the AFRL T&E Office over
time when its capacity could only produce three test plans per day.
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Figure 4.2: Variation at Program Management

Homan et al. (2011) mentioned that the AFRL T&E Office was unable to
eliminate the constant late notifications or tardy test packages arriving from the program
manager, in addition to the non-standardized test packages. Homan et al. (2011) also
discussed the effect of “firefighting” at the AFRL T&E Office where members defer
resources to problematic (or late) programs and work harder to meet requirements and
push completed programs to the next station. This effect causes the information to get
“pushed” instead of “pulled.” According to McManus (2005), information flow should be
pulled, not pushed. In other words, information should flow when it is needed by
downstream processes, not when upstream processes are done. Repenning et al. (2001)
also added that occasional “firefighting” may offer short-term gains, but these temporary
gains will come at the expense of the long-run flow of the entire process. Firefighting can
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also create bottlenecks for the downstream process, especially when the later process
steps have variation, which possibility is discussed in the next simulation.
As shown in Figure 4.3, the FOA at AFFTC had variations in approving SUAV
test plans coming from AFRL. One of the main problems identified earlier was the
bottleneck at the FOA in the overall process (Homan et al., 2011). This bottleneck was
caused by the increasing number of test packages that were pushed to the FOA from the
AFRL T&E Office, resulting in variations in approval time. In many instances where
programs were deemed low risk, only a single approval authority at the AFFTC handled
all of the test packages from AFRL. The problem was even worse when the single FOA
at AFFTC was also responsible for nine other local test organizations. These notional
results show that the pushed information was not needed by the recipient in the
downstream process, and it would certainly not flow “at the right time” for PMs to
execute their tests on schedule.
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Figure 4.3: Bottleneck at AFFTC

In all simulations conducted with variations of at least one task, the test execution
schedule was greatly affected. The simulation could continue with multiple variables at
different tasks, but the purpose was to demonstrate the process behavior over a long
period of time. With reduced input variability and process variability, the simulation
shows improvement in the flow process and allows stations to have excess capacity to
pull work. Eliminating variability also allows straight-through flow to meet customer
(i.e., program managers) demands.
McManus (2005) specifies that bottlenecks can be caused by effects external to
the process, such as the lack of resources, information, or authority to proceed. Such
effects coincide with the current-state of the AFRL/AFFTC approval process. That is, if
there is a lack of resources, typically the FOA personnel are not available to start a task
and the task waits, thus creating a bottleneck. If the externally-provided information is
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not available, typically because of the inadequate test plans from the PM, the tasks either
wait or proceed with “bad” information (i.e., firefighting) only to be reworked later (after
mishaps). Finally, if external approval authority other than from AFFTC is required to
proceed, and it is not forthcoming, the task will wait.

4.2.2 Value Stream Mapping Results
In summary, the results from VSM analysis conducted with data variability
support the five major problems which were first identified by Homan et al. (2001). Not
only does this study support the identified problems, it also postulates that, based on
McManus’s VSM manual (2005) and through MIT’s Variation Simulator, bottlenecks are
caused by effects external to the process. The variability simulation uncovered the heavy
workload and firefighting support that the AFRL T&E Office displayed when PMs failed
to follow standardized guidelines. This led to firefighting from the AFRL T&E Office
which ultimately led to the bottleneck at AFFTC when more than enough tests plans were
compiled at the FOA for approval.

4.3 Acceptable Cost and Optimal Risk
In this portion of the analysis, a notional optimal level of risk is created to
evaluate the value of each risk factor before reaching an optimal level of risk and the
deciding cost in flight testing them. Risk is usually expressed in terms of probability of
occurrence and impact, which leads to dollars and time, and each project will have to
control its own destiny through factoring the different indications of risks. SUAV flight
mishaps may be all too common for PMs who have flight tested them and those who have
the experience to explain why flight mishaps happen. As discussed earlier in the accident
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rates of SUAVs, it is all too familiar to the DoD and the FAA. Therefore, they require a
thorough review in flight personnel policy, training, and operations for SUAV tests.
Figure 4.4 shows the balancing between the level of risks and the costs of a SUAV
program to the optimal level of risk, as discussed in Chapter 3.

Figure 4.4: Acceptable and Optimal Risk
(Morgan, 1981)

4.3.1 Perceptual Factors in Assessing Risk
From the previous analyses in cost measurement and variability, the cost of risk
reduction at the AFFTC safety reviews have shown to be minimal compared to the
overall costs of the entire program, suggesting that more reviews should be done to quell
the increasing number of flight mishaps. Additionally, the time it took for additional
reviews at AFFTC was less than anticipated, but that was because of recent personnel
changes. Furthermore, personnel at AFFTC were experiencing variations in approving
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low risk test plans when too many programs were pushed to the FOA for approval,
causing major bottlenecks at AFFTC.
In light of the two previous analyses, why would the PMs and the AFRL T&E
Office want to de-scope the level of oversight from AFFTC on low risk programs given
that the cost and time required for AFFTC to review them were not as high as originally
thought? In other words, what is the reason why people are reluctant to perform risk
analysis (i.e., mishap mitigations at AFFTC) for low risk programs when the process time
is short and the cost is inexpensive? The key issue is one of perception. Cost
measurement results show that the AFFTC processing time is organizational and
personality-dependent—that personnel changes in the future may not have the same test
plan approval rate, thus adding the uncertainty in the overall process. Additionally, the
PMs and the AFRL T&E Office felt that there was no value added at the AFFTC review
process.
So why do SUAV programs have to spend a few thousand dollars and an extra
week to get the approval from AFFTC when there is no perceived value added from the
AFFTC review process? The answer lies in the optimal level of risk that the PM is
willing to take. This optimal level of risk taking is non-quantitative and must be based on
the perceptual factors that are relevant to the assessment of risk, as identified by Hillson
and Hulett (2004).

1. Familiarity: The extent to which an individual, team, or organization has
previously encountered the situation drives whether the risk probability is
perceived as high or low. Where there is little or no previous relevant
experience, skill or knowledge, the degree of uncertainty is perceived as
higher than that case when it is assessed by individuals or groups who
have come across the situation before.
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2. Manageability. The degree of control or choice that can be exercised in a
given situation drives the assessment of uncertainty, even if the perception
is illusory. Where a risk is seen as susceptible to control, risk probability
is assessed as lower than in situations where controllability or choice are
absent (or perceived to be so).
3. Proximity. If the possible occurrence of a risk is close in time or space to
those assessing its probability, it will be seen as more likely than risks
which might occur later in time or further away in space.
4. Propinquity. This term is used to describe the perceived potential for the
consequences of a risk to affect the individual or group directly. The
closer the impact is to those assessing the risk, the higher its perceived
probability is.

These factors are hard to recognize and address, as they and other perceptual
influences operate subconsciously when individuals and teams assess risk probability and
category (Hillson & Hulett, 2004). Another critical reason why low risk programs have to
go through AFFTC approval review is to hold accountability and responsibility in the
program; these “ways of seeing and understandings” of risk in organizational settings
were seen as methods of deferring blame to any single organization with respect to issues
of risk and responsibility (Hutter & Power 2005). After all, organizations’ and
individuals’ interests may vary, but they address issues in test flights through
considerations of commonalties in risk management.

4.3.2 Heuristics and Biases in Risk Assessment
In assessing risk, other factors that influence the PMs’ decisions in the perception
of risk are known as heuristics or rules-of-thumb. Hillson and Hulett (2004) define
heuristics as internal frames of reference used by individuals and groups to inform
judgment when no firm data are available. Hillson and Hulett (2004) emphasize the
influence of introducing two types of heuristic bias into assessments in situations of
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uncertainty. The first type of bias is motivational bias, where the assessor seeks to
improve the apparent position of the situation by modifying the estimate of risk
probability. The second type of bias is cognitive bias, which arises from unconscious
attempts to rationalize the lack of certain knowledge (Hillson & Hulett, 2004). Of these
two biases, it is observed that motivational bias is perhaps more commonly found in PMs.
The author also noticed in the various interviews that PMs were more likely to exhibit
motivational bias. This is a purely anecdotal impression from the author and this has no
hard data to quantify this effect.
Motivational bias is difficult to identify and manage as the person or organization
assessing the risk has an interest in influencing the results of the analysis (Hillson &
Hulett, 2004). SUAVs are distinct by their sizes, costs, and complexity. These factors
often define the risk of their test flights. The presumption of motivational bias usually
makes the probability of the risk of SUAVs seem to be smaller than what it really is,
especially in order to reduce the perception of risk among key stakeholders. It is observed
that PMs will use the notion of their SUAVs as being small, lightweight, and inexpensive
to de-value the purpose of any extra safety reviews that may cause their programs to
incur more costs and time. Granted, it is true from the data gathered that most SUAV
programs were deemed as low risk, but the cost sensitivity in the payloads carried by
SUAVs were often the deciding factor in categorizing risks.

4.3.3 Notional Optimal Level of Risk
From these perceptual and heuristics factors, PMs will argue that the absence and
noninvolvement from AFFTC may create a reduction in the cost of risk abatement, which
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reduces the total costs and time incurred from the flight approval process and SUAV
operation. This reduction will create a new cost of risk abatement and a new optimal level
of risk, as shown in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5: Notional Optimal Level of Risk (without AFFTC involvement)

This noninvolvement from AFFTC in low risk programs will be manifested by
AFFTC giving full approval authority on low risk tests to the AFRL T&E Office. Not
only would this new level of risk abatement reduce the time and costs for the PMs at
AFRL, but it would also give the reviewers at AFFTC more time to perform their main
duties at AFFTC, given that the FOA’s main duties come from the flight test
organizations at AFFTC. Furthermore, since 90% of the tests coming from AFRL are low
risk, it would assume that the costs are low and the risks can be negated. Additionally, the
data variability analyses have shown a bottleneck at AFFTC when the FOA experiences
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variation in approving SUAV test plans coming from AFRL. This new optimal level of
risk results in a lesser total cost, and its expected losses from risk is even less due the
overall factors from the PM’s presumption in the motivational bias and heuristic
approaches. This notional optimal level of risk will be carried to the latter section of this
chapter to create a notional common threshold and decision rule matrix.
Noninvolvement from AFFTC would certainly increase the number of SUAV
programs and increase R&D in SUAVs and their systems. However, risks are still
inherently apparent to the PMs and the flight testers. Every project is unique and SUAV
projects are no different when it comes to safety. The mishap rate is still high, and the
technologies to improve SUAV safety records are still being developed; therefore, it is
prudent to approach testing with attentiveness when no AFFTC involvement is granted.

4.3.4 A What-if Scenario
The problems of unintended consequences are high whether the program is
categorized as low risk or not. Flight testers are fully aware that most of the accidents
happen between test points or on low risk activities (Ward et al., 2006). Rules and
regulations are in place for a reason, but in times of budget crunches, there is always
pressure to eliminate unnecessary work and waste when results confirm non-added value
work. However, when it comes to proper leadership (AFMC/A3, 2006), the thought was
not in terms of what the testers in the T&E community characterize as low, medium, or
high risk, but the thought stemmed from accountability and responsibility terms—that all
flying incurs some level of risk and proper supervision is better to measure and mitigate
risks. In an evocative scenario, it would be extremely uncomfortable and an
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embarrassment for the test team to explain to leadership about how a low risk mission
flown by an AFRL contractor experienced a Class A mishap when the mishap
investigation revealed that no rated Operations Group Commander (O-6) oversight was
discussed, as dictated by the MOA between AFRL and AFFTC. This thought-vignette
was one of the arguments against an improvement initiative from both AFRL and AFFTC
to reduce the scope of AFFTC oversight on low risk programs, and was quickly rejected
at AFMC/A3. It is the very same reason why the MOA was put in place at the beginning
of the joint AFRL/AFFTC flight safety reviews.

4.3.5 Managing Risk Results
One of the challenging outcomes of risk assessment is that it is difficult to
objectively quantify risks. Hence, the qualitative results discussed two main objectives.
Two questions were answered in the optimal risk analysis section: Why is there a drive to
de-scope the AFFTC oversight of low risk programs when AFFTC time and cost to
review were short and less expensive than originally thought? And why do SUAV
programs have to spend a few thousand dollars and the extra week to get the approval
from AFFTC when there is no value added to the program? This research has also
included the top level acceptable cost of optimal risk analysis in which the perceptual
factors and heuristic factors were taken into account to determine whether or not the extra
reviews at AFFTC is necessary. Motivational bias was seen as a tool that most PMs
would use to assess risks on their programs based on the notion that their SUAVs were
small, inexpensive, and can be replaced with commercial-off-the-shelf parts. The results
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from cost measurement analysis, variability analysis, and optimal risk analysis will be
tied together to come up with a threshold and reach a decision rule in the next section.

4.4 AFFTC Threshold and Decision Rule
This part of the chapter will sum the previous three analyses and determine a
recommendation for an acceptable threshold which would help PMs at test organizations
reach a decision rule on a flight test approval process for SUAVs. According to Hillson
(2004), an acceptable threshold defines a target against which the effectiveness of
responses can be measured. Without such a target, too much effort might be spent on
mitigating risk beyond what would be acceptable, or reviews might not go far enough in
reducing threats and enhancing opportunities (Hillson, 2004).
Several considerations and assumptions were made when attempting to estimate a
notional cost balance statement for SUAVs. From previous estimates, the total SUAV
assets and liabilities came to about $191,500 for a low risk program. This is roughly the
same as a Class C mishap definition, which is the total cost of property damage,
including all aircraft damage between $10,000 and $200,000. In addition to monetary
loss, Class C mishaps also involve injuries that result in five or more workdays lost.
Because of the approximate SUAV cost assets and liabilities, it is recommended that the
decision rule threshold for cost remain at $200,000. The justification behind this cost
threshold is that it holds true to the average cost of the SUAV flight test and anything less
than $200,000 in total assets and liabilities is deemed a Class C mishap should an
accident happen. In addition to the cost threshold, there is the size and weight of the
SUAV’s airframe to consider should it crash to the ground and cause injury and damage
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to people and property. A notional threshold in SUAV size and weight will also
determine whether the program should go to the extra review at AFFTC.
It is unknown if the DoD or the FAA have rules and regulations for SUAVs based
on their size and kinetic energy. However, research from other non-military agencies,
such as the JAA and EUROCONTROL (2004), has proposed a cut-off line with respect
to SUAV size and kinetic energy at impact. The JAA/EUROCONTROL reviewed the
worldwide UAV fleet and judged the capability of existing SUAV models on their
workload, masses, kinetic energy, airspeed, and UAV operator’s ability. The report
proposed a guideline for the regulation of SUAV systems. Generally, most UAVs less
than 150 kg are classified as light or SUAV systems (JAA, Weibel & Hansman, 2004).
These SUAVs do not have to comply with the same regulations as manned aircraft, yet
do not qualify as model aircraft in Europe. However, they are required to operate within
restrictions, such as daylight operations and within the visual range of the operator, and in
restricted airspace (JAA, 2004). Larger UAVs weighing more than 150 kg, with a kinetic
energy at impact of more than 95 kJ flying in unrestricted airspace or outside the visual
range of the operator will be required to be flight tested and approved in a similar manner
to that of manned aircraft (JAA, 2004).

4.4.1 Notional Threshold
Based off of the notional cost threshold and the proposal from the
JAA/EUROCONTROL report, this research proposes using the same standard and
regulation based on the size and energy criteria as that of the JAA/EUROCONTROL, and
recommends that the DoD and FAA adopt the same technique, or something similar.
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Figure 4.6 provides a notional decision rule matrix incorporating size and energy criteria
as it pertains to the evaluation of SUAV flight test approval process. The notional
decision rule matrix is flexible and can be used given the dependencies of many heuristic
factors based on risk assessment and the experience that comes with it. These factors
include the environment in which the SUAV is flown, the maturity of the system, and the
product weight, size, speed, and complexity. The decision rule matrix assumes that the
SUAVs are flown in restricted airspace.

Figure 4.6: Notional Threshold

The framework for adoption of this decision matrix is based on the fact that low
cost SUAVs with simplistic designs should require less review time. The framework also
allows the test team and those at AFFTC and AFRL to assess the risks involved in some
of these SUAV programs before a decision is reached. It provides test teams a notional
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“tipping point” where AFFTC safety reviewers would essentially add value to the flight
approval process. For example, the FOA may spend a greater amount of time on
programs that are high cost and/or the systems involved are larger than the average sized
UAV that is usually tested.

4.4.2 Notional Decision Rule Matrix and Outcome
Sometimes, decision-making follows a simple rule; people view the problem in a
stereotyped way and often determine if the given situation is common or familiar based
on their past experiences (Klein, 1998). Likewise, if people decide that the situation is
uncommon or unfamiliar, then they follow an alternate safer decision (Klein, 1998).
Quadrants 1 and 4 in the decision rule matrix clearly demonstrates Klein’s successful
decision making model (1998), that the situation is either common (from past
experiences) or uncommon (alternate safe decision). Quadrants 2 and 3 differ in their
level of consequences, as the decision is to have either the extra review or no extra
review. Quadrant 2 is deemed acceptable in daily operations because of its conservative
decision which leads to low consequence (Klein, 1998). Quadrant 3 is not acceptable
because it may lead to highly consequential damage or injury (Klein, 1998). Figure 4.7
shows how decisions are made based on the PM’s experience with the program and the
given situation.
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Figure 4.7: Notional Decision Rule Matrix and Outcome
(Modified from Klein, 1998)

4.4.3 Meta-language and Heuristics
In order to better define the notional decision rule quadrant as shown in Figure 4.6
and Figure 4.7, one may be inclined to describe risk using meta-language. Risk metalanguage is a structured description of a risk which separates cause, risk, and effect.
Meta-language allows risk analysis to provide a three part structured risk statement that
should ensure risk identification through a heuristic approach (Hillson, 2008). The risk
meta-language format can be written like this: “Because of [cause(s)], [risk] might occur,
which would lead to [effect(s)].”
Causes are present facts or conditions which can give rise to risks (Hillson, 2008).
Once the cause is identified, one can determine the risk by asking “so what?” which
would lead to a decision on the uncertainties about the cause. The effects stem from the
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conditional future state that the risk decision produces. With respect to the notional
decision rule quadrant, the risk meta-language can be written in four separate formats for
each quadrant, as shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Meta-Language and Decision Rule
1. “Because my UAV program is expensive and its impact energy is high [cause], I
should increase my time and resources in risk reduction [risk decision], which should
lead to low mishap probability and no losses [effect].” This meta-language implies
the UAV program is expensive and heavy at impact, to which the PM would make the
decision to have the extra review at AFFTC in order to mitigate future risks.
2. “Because my UAV program is expensive and its impact energy is low [cause], I
should make some effort in risk reduction [risk decision], which should lead to low
mishap probability and expect low losses [effect].” This meta-language implies that
the UAV, although lightweight, is still expensive, which would lead the PM to invest
a conservative amount in risk reduction at AFFTC in order to reduce future mishaps,
which would otherwise cause the expensive UAV to crash and incur greater losses.
The effect is a lower expected loss due to the initial risk reduction effort.
3. “Because my UAV program is inexpensive but its impact energy is high [cause], I
should not invest too much time and effort in risk reduction [risk decision], which
may yield high mishap probability from risk [effect].” This meta-language suggests
that the UAV, although heavy, is inexpensive and probably simple to build. The risk
decision is to forgo with the extra review due to its inexpensiveness; however, the PM
should expect the risk of failure (mishaps) to be high since it does not go through the
extra review.
4. “Because my UAV program is inexpensive and its impact energy is low [cause], I
should not invest too much time and effort in risk reduction [risk decision], which
could lead to medium or low probability of a mishap [effect].” This meta-language
suggests that the UAV is inexpensive and lightweight, therefore, the PM should not
need the extra review before flying, however, the probability of a mishap is minimum
or low due to the lack of reviews.

An area of concern in the decision rule is where SUAVs exceed the proposed
mass and kinetic energy at impact criteria but they are under the $200,000 threshold
(decision quadrant 3). The big mass and high kinetic energy at impact may present a
hazardous flying experience should a mishap occur on the ground with injury to
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personnel involved. This would create a cautious choice for all personnel involved in
deciding whether or not AFFTC is needed and if it would add any significant safety
comments in the safety review process. Therefore, this framework and decision rule is
based on an experienced judgment and heuristic ability of the UAV operator and the test
team to control the vehicle.
In summary, risk meta-language is a useful tool for clarifying risk descriptions.
The simple three-part framework and decision rule offer general guidelines and rule-ofthumb principles that an experienced PM may be able to find risk, uncertainties, and the
effects of risk decisions. There is no best approach in making a decision in whether or not
to add the extra review from AFFTC. The best approach may be answered with “it
depends.” It depends on the cost of the UAV, the level of sophisticated hardware
involved in the UAV, the level of details and complexity of the risk process, and any
external factors that play in UAV test flights.

4.5 Application of Notional Threshold and Decision Rule Matrix
After collecting SUAV data with total cost, mass, and impact energy (see
Appendix C), this research plots 16 AFRL SUAV programs using the notional threshold
and decision rule matrix for further analysis, as shown in Figure 4.8. Notice that the
majority of the SUAV programs from 2011 were lightweight (less than 150 kg) and less
than $200,000. As seen in Figure 4.8, one SUAV program had cost, weight, and kinetic
energy which exceeded the notional threshold. This program experienced a flight mishap,
which was probably caused by the vehicle’s immaturity as data showed that the vehicle
had less than one hour of total flying time. Another SUAV (quadrant 2) cost more than
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$200,000, but its mass and kinetic energy were less than the notional threshold; it also
experienced a mishap. However, unlike the SUAV mishap in quadrant 1, this vehicle had
more flying time and was considered mature. The third SUAV mishap (quadrant 4) was
under the cost threshold and proposed mass and kinetic energy. This particular vehicle
was considered mature with four sorties and over nine hours of total flying time.

Figure 4.8: 2011 SUAV Flight Tests

Based on the limited data and the three mishaps given, the above figure shows
that there is no correlation between flight mishaps and an SUAV’s cost and their physical
sizes and energy. Nor there is any correlation between system maturity (total flying
times) and flight failures. Figure 4.8 also shows that the majority of SUAVs submitted for
flight testing are less than $200,000 and below that of the proposed mass and kinetic
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energy threshold. Furthermore, AFRL mishap data from previous years shown in Figure
4.9 reveals that the majority of mishaps were deemed as Class E events, which are
occurrences that do not meet reportable mishap classification criteria, but are important to
investigate and report for mishap prevention. A total of 46 mishaps were Class E events,
eight were considered as Class C mishaps, and only one resulted in a Class B mishap
from 2007 to 2012.

Figure 4.9: AFRL Mishaps by Fiscal Year

Essentially, SUAVs are sometimes prone to system failure; therefore, the flight
approval process for SUAVs should be based on the judgmental cost and the proposed
mass and impact energy. After all, SUAVs are still a relatively new platform with many
opportunities for research and development. An appealing aspect of SUAV development
is the fact that the majority of AFRL SUAVs are inexpensive, simple, and tiny to build
and assemble versus larger UAVs or manned aircraft.
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With a total cost less than or equal to $200,000 and a small and light weight
airframe, an experienced SUAV operator could fly the SUAV without experiencing a
mishap or cause extensive damage to people and property. Therefore, in consideration of
an SUAV program, it should not necessarily adhere to the extra scrutiny that takes extra
time and spends additional resources of the flight test team. Innovations and
breakthrough technologies should not be hampered by policy for the sake of a $200,000
or less mishap. However, for programs that are well over $200,000, its size and
complexity make them a primary target for safety reviews. Therefore, it is within reason
to have the extra reviews and operational authority to approve the flying machine.

4.6 Summary
This chapter has presented the results and analysis from data gathered from the
flight test offices. Starting with the cost measurement analysis and the notional cost
balance statement for an average SUAV program, the initial results revealed that the total
time and cost in AFFTC review did not present a significant investment in time and
money from the test team at AFRL. Although the cost and time were minimal, having the
additional feedback from the FOA at AFFTC may also add some risk mitigations to the
test plan. However, further interviews with the AFRL T&E Office revealed that the
feedback coming from AFFTC often lacks interest and value to the test plan.
Additionally, cost sensitivity analysis results confirmed that SUAV program costs are not
sensitive to system maturity, but rather to the payloads carried by the SUAVs. Data from
the variability analysis confirmed that there was heavy workload and firefighting support
at the AFRL T&E Office when PMs and test teams failed to submit standardized test
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plans on time with adequate notifications of upcoming tests. Variability simulation
showed a bottleneck at the AFFTC support due to the push effect caused by accumulated
tests and late notifications from the AFRL T&E Office. Lastly, a top level risk analysis
was conducted using perceptual factors and heuristic factors to determine whether or not
the extra reviews at AFFTC were necessary. A notional optimal level of risk, including
the noninvolvement from AFFTC, which decreased the total costs and time incurred in
the flight approval process and SUAV operation was developed, but includes a cautious
warning.
Finally, in combining all three earlier analyses, this study creates a top-level
AFFTC threshold and decision rule recommendation, which was determined from the
average $200,000 SUAV program cost and the weight and impact energy of the SUAV.
The decision rule quadrant and the successful decision model should allow the test team
and those at AFFTC and AFRL to assess the risks involved in SUAV programs before a
decision is reached. It also allows test teams to determine a “tipping point” where AFFTC
safety reviewers would essentially add value to the overall flight approval process.
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V. Discussions and Conclusions

This chapter provides discussions and conclusions based on results and analysis
of this research. Recommendations are provided with a threshold and decision rule
approach in the critical chain of SUAV flight approval process. Meta-language and
heuristics are used to identify and describe risks by separating the causes from uncertain
events. The following section summarizes recommendations for SUAVs’ flight approval
process and their typical characteristic attributes which include being inexpensive,
simple, and often fast to acquire. Next, this chapter wraps up with the research objectives
and answers the questions that were asked in the introductory chapter. Additional
observations are made on risk management by leadership and the lack of buy-in from
leadership to allow AFRL to have full authority on low risk programs. Lastly, this chapter
summarizes its conclusions with limitations for this study and suggestions for future
research.

5.1 Capturing Research Objectives
This study provided an overarching analysis of the SUAV flight test process
currently used by AFRL with oversight from AFFTC. The objective was to establish a
measure of benefit for an abbreviated flight test process. While the objective has been
met with the notional decision rule matrix, along with ranges for the cut-off cost and
SUAV size and impact energy. However, it also revealed a management approach that is
difficult to quantitatively measure, and requires years of program management and flight
test experience in determining the risk of forgoing AFFTC involvement.

81

In approaching transparency and improving safety reviews of the flight test
program, multiple layers of safety reviews add benefits to mishap mitigation and
accountability, yet they may be time consuming for PMs who want to accelerate their
tests. Therefore, is it necessary for SUAVs to have the same criteria applied as that of a
larger, manned aircraft in flight test approval process? The short answer is yes and no.
Safety and accountability are two critical issues in flight testing; however, they should
not create an environment in which innovation and development are held back because of
a simple mishap from a low risk test plan. This leads to another question which was
raised at the beginning of this study: Do SUAVs have to go through the same mishap
investigation and reporting process? Evidence from AFRL T&E Office has suggested
that these mishaps were minimal, and sometimes they were expected. There is no doubt
that flight safety and mishap mitigations are applied at every step of the flight approval
process, as instructed in numerous AFIs concerning flight testing. Some of these mishaps
can be as simple as a crash landing on an unpaved runway that caused damage to the
propeller of the SUAV, but it still resulted in weeks of mishap investigation and going
through the return to flight approval process. Nevertheless, not all mishaps are minute; a
program at threshold price of $200,000 with expensive payload would certainly raise
concerns if there was no oversight on safety reviews from an appropriate authority.
In contrast to the traditional military standards on SUAV flight tests, the DoD
ought to look into research from non-military specifications. This study has developed a
notional decision rule based on the proposed JAA/EUROCONTROL (2004) technique on
SUAV weight and kinetic energy at impact. The consequences of using such a technique
would simplify the SUAV flight test approval process and could save money in the long
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run. With a simplified approval process, R&D organizations might be able to increase
and expedite the weapons development needed for the warfighters. This coincides with
the current DoD policy of supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions globally. Moreover, an abbreviated approval process for an SUAV is greatly
needed for rapid reaction and rapid deployment to the theatre of operation to support the
warfighters, as opposed to the generic flight test approval process.
Additionally, data from cost sensitivity and variability analyses showed that
system maturity costs were varied with SUAV payload costs. Program managers are
always fighting system instability and the risk of uncertainties in the program. These
uncertainties may be caused by outside influences such as technology, environment, and
political and financial situations. By prioritizing a list of “must haves” and “good to
haves,” test teams may be able to minimize the cost of the program and also make it more
manageable in determining risks and use the decision rule to determine whether to
include reviews by the AFFTC authority. The variability analysis showed a bottleneck
occurring at the FOA due to variability in the process caused by the constant flooding of
test packages coming from AFRL to the FOA.
In summary, a generic standardized regulation for SUAVs may help the
separation of risk assessment and risk management. Differentiating between the two may
prove helpful in determining risk analysis when weighing the benefits of an abbreviated
flight test process and the costs associated with going through the entire flight approval
process. Using a current generic standardized regulation in flight test approval process
may have the advantage of consistency, predictability, and administrative efficiency.
However, there are also disadvantages in having SUAVs going through the same
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standardized flight test approval process as those of larger manned aircraft. These
disadvantages can include overgeneralizing SUAVs as having a complex integrated
system like those of larger manned aircraft. Another disadvantage is the misallocation of
resources and schedule; unlike larger manned aircraft, SUAVs are generally operated by
a small team of engineers and observers. Lastly, by putting SUAVs through the same
flight test approval process required of larger manned aircraft, there will be some delays
which may eventually cause research and development to stop. This mixture of an overly
unwieldy risk assessment policy and the potential for interrupted scientific research
would probably cause delays and frustration for the PM and the test team.

5.2 Impact of Leadership Risk Management Style
One of the major surprises from this study was the unexpected perspective from
AFRL on the lack of value and attention provided by AFFTC reviews. It should be noted
that this study does not suggest that the FOA at AFFTC lacks the expertise to provide
adequate reviews to the safety of the test missions. This study, however, advocates the
notion of a “tipping point” where AFFTC safety reviewers would essentially add value to
the overall flight approval process, as discussed in the previous chapter. This tipping
point is determined using the notional decision rule matrix. With manning levels in the
Air Force already strained, and the fact that 90% of AFRL’s flight test programs are
considered by the AFRL and AFFTC as low risk, the level of authority and
empowerment in low risk programs should be delegated to those personnel in the field.
This delegation would greatly benefit both parties if low risk programs were approved at
AFRL instead of AFFTC. It would also reduce the bottleneck problem at the FOA while
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increasing opportunities for further flight testing by AFRL. Homan et al. (2011) also
identified these issues and the potential opportunities to improve the flight test process.
A problem here lies in the risk adverse mismanagement style of leadership. Stulz
(2009) and Taleb et al. (2009) discuss ways that organizations mismanage risk; one of
them is the mistake of relying on historical data and becoming convinced that studying
the past will help better manage risk in the future. In essence, leadership relies on these
historical events (i.e., past mishaps from AFRL test flights) to control risk by predicting
extreme events. However, low-probability, high-impact events are almost impossible to
forecast, and “because of socioeconomic randomness, there is no such thing as a ‘typical’
failure or a ‘typical success’” (Taleb et al., 2009). Numerous joint AFFTC/AFRL
proposals have been funneled up to leadership for the delegation of low risk programs to
AFRL, yet their status is unknown or leadership refuses to consider them. This overly
conservative risk management approach of leadership creates a non-empowered
environment for those who want to test their programs and for those who review them.

5.3 Conclusions
This research effort sought to establish top-level quantitative and qualitative
measures of benefit for an abbreviated flight test process for SUAVs. Issues such as cost
sensitivity, process improvement, and risk management were discussed in this study. The
literature review exposed performance gaps, cost and data variability, as well as buy-in
from AFRL and AFFTC leadership to delegate low risk programs to AFRL; however,
this was rejected due to the lack of accountability in small, low-risk AFRL programs. The
literature also reviewed the importance of flight test and the factors that affect the
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effectiveness of the flight testing. The increasing trends in SUAV technology
development combined with the ever increasing DoD investment for SUAVs in the
military has allowed greater R&D effort, yet it is sometimes limited and scaled back
because of outdated policy and regulations on SUAV operations in the NAS and
restricted airspace. The methodology section explained the research design for this study
based on cost and time criteria, combined with data variability simulation and a heuristic
approach to risk management.
Research and development in new or un-tested technology often times is
susceptible to additional risks, such as flight mishaps while airborne and during takeoff
and landing. Often times, some form of risks in new R&D technologies may be
acceptable in the pursuit of knowledge. For some risks, such as SUAV flight testing, it
produces benefits to flyers and operators in the form of greater understanding of the
vehicle’s flight characteristics and technological improvements. The findings from this
research conclude with a SUAV threshold and decision rule matrix that will empower
leadership to make decisions based on relevant data appropriate for SUAVs.

5.4 Limitations and Future Research
There is no doubt that the findings from this research are limited due to the
assumptions that it has made. These limitations stem from the lack of adequate data in
manpower and resources necessary to capture the entire SUAV business. A larger and
broader examination of each SUAV program may give rise to improved assumptions.
Another limitation is the data quality in this study, as such data are often limited in
distribution due to the sensitivity of these programs. There are definitely more concerning
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issues than what is captured in cost and SUAV weights and sizes in the flight test
approval process. Approving routine and safe flight tests for SUAVs involve several
issues that touch on nearly every aspect of the aviation field, including safety, security,
air traffic, regulatory, and socio-economic. These categories should be addressed and
assessed in future research to present a grander view of the factors and their impacts
associated with SUAV flight tests.
Although this study addresses some of the problems and shortcomings from both
AFFTC and AFRL organizations and also provided a decision rule recommendation
based on its methodology, there are still areas that can be improved and expanded upon.
With better cost data from all previous years’ of AFRL flight test programs, future
research would be improved on SUAV management costs and their estimates for further
cost-benefit analysis. Another area of research that would greatly benefit the flight
approval process for SUAVs is to study the variation of UAV sizes and costs and
determine if there is variability in the processing time based on their sizes and
manufacturing and operating costs.
This research had difficulty determining the optimal level of risk when
approaching the approval process in the critical chain. So the optimal level of risk and the
new total cost presented in this study is merely an empirical experiment based on
available data. Future research should utilize the notional optimal level of risk and
determine the appropriate cost of risk abatement in order to find a more quantitative
overall total cost and optimal level of risk. Future research should also conduct more
appropriate interviews with the FOA at AFFTC, program leaders, and SUAV operators in
the overall process. This is an area that would greatly benefit from further discussion and
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could be broadened in future research that includes SUAV operators’ workload,
situational awareness, and human effectiveness issues in SUAV operating environments.
Lastly, since this research only focused on one flight test approval process being done per
the MOA between AFFTC and AFRL, it is strongly recommended that future follow-on
research should seek to generalize and validate this approach and methodology.
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Appendix A: Memorandum of Agreement between AFRL and AFFTC

2006-06-06MA

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
AlRFORCERESEARCHL ABORATORY
AND

AIR FORCE FLIGHT TEST CENTER
I. PURPOSE. This memorandum of agreement is to establish a working relationship
andJ?rocesses to support the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC), 412th Test Wing,
412 Operations Group operational control (OPCON) for all flight activities conducted
by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). The AFRL has overall responsibility for
program management and administrative support for its research programs. The AFFTC
has responsibility for the safe and effective conduct of flight operations for AFRL
research programs requiring flight activities. The AFMC/A3 defers OPCON to the 412th
Operations Group Commander (OG/CC) for AFRL research programs involving military,
government civilian or contractor flight operations. To avoid duplicate reviews,
inspections or evaluations, an integrated team approach for conducting program flight
operation oversight will be used.
2. REFERENCES. The responsibilities of flying operations under the supervision of
the AFFTC and the 412th Operations Group are detailed in Air Force Instructions.
Ground and flight activities will comply with applicable regulatory guidance.
Modifications of and exceptions to AFI guidance must be coordinated through the 412th
OG/CC, in writing, to the designated Office of Primary Responsibility for the specific
instruction. Below is a list of the primary Instructions applicable to flight operations.
AFI 91-206(1)
AFI 91-204 and AFMC Sup 1
AFI 91-202 and AFMC Sup I
AFFTCI 91-5
AFI 99-103 and AFMC, AFRL supplements
AFI 11-401 and AFMC Sup 1
AFI 11-202 volwnes 1, 2, and 3; AFMC supplements
AFI 11-2FT volumes 1, 2, and 3
AFJI 10-220 and AFMC Sup 1
AFI 10-206
3. SCOPE. This agreement shall apply to military, government civilian and contractor
flight operations regardless of program size or location of actual flight operations.
4. RESPONSIBILmES. AFRL will continue to use processes in place for managinl
its test programs as outlined in AFI 99-103 and its supplements. The AFFTC and 412
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Operations Group will provide effective flight operations ove~sight of all AFRL test
planning and flight execution. As clarification, the following specifics apply:
4.1 AFRL RESPONSffiiLITIES.

a. Provide the 412th OG with program procedures and documentation to meet the
intent of AFI 11-401 and its AFMC and AFFTC supplements.
1) Monthly, prior to the last day of any month, the AFRL will provide the
412th OG with an electronic summary of all program flight activity
accomplished by each program over the last month, and the scheduled
flight activity expected for the next month.
2) As a minimum, each program will be required to document individual
flight authorizations using Aeronautical Orders, IMT Form 81 or IMT
Form 5416 through the 412th OG. This will be accomplished even ifthe
aircraft to be flown is not USAF owned.

3) Daily flight authorization will be accomplished locally using the
procedures detailed in AFI 11-401 and its AFMC and AFFTC
supplements. The owning AFRL Division Chief will act as the flying
squadron commander and authorize the daily flying schedule, with copies
faxed to the 412th OG before flight.
b. Provide the 412th OG with appropriate and sufficient evidence of aircrew and
operator qualifications, training and currencies required to perform in-flight duties
as detailed in the program test plan and to meet the intent of AFJ ll-202V1, V2,
V3 and their AFMC and AFFTC supplements.
1) The specific approval for in-flight duties will be given by the 412th OG.
It is the AFRL program manager's responsibility for ensuring individuals
performing any in-flight duties are certified as qualified and current.
Modifications of and exceptions to AFI guidance must be coordinated
through the 412th OG/CC, in writing, to the designated Office of Primary
Responsibility for the specific instruction.

2) AFRL programs that fly with airborne and/or ground station assets
valued at over $200,000, is assessed as MEDIUM or HIGH risk or fly
under an FAA approved Certificate of Authorization (COA) as outlined in
FAA regulation 7610.4 will comply with all AFI 10 and 11 series
instructions.
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c. Provide a rated billet at AFRL for the AFITC to fill with a Major or
Lieutenant Colonel acting as a local Test Representative representing the 412th
Operations Group. Test Representative responsibilities will be detailed in the
positionjob description. Duties will be determined collaboratively with AFRL
and the 412th OG.
d. Coordinate the technical and safety review information obtained through
standard AFRL Configuration Control, Technical Review and Safety Review
Board (CCB!TRB/SRB) processes with AFFTC organizations.
I) For all AFRL research programs involving flight operations, copies of
CCBrrRB/SRB packages and test plans will be provided to the 412th
OG/CC at least fourteen days prior to the first planned test activity. More
time may be required for review and coordination if the program is
assessed by AFRL safety as MEDIUM or HIGH risk.
2) AFFTCI 91-5 details the signature authority for LOW, MEDIUM and
HIGH risk test plans for AFFTC programs and is modified below to
support this MOA .
.
Oos Grouo CC or cauivalent

I Test WinR CC or cauivalenl
I

AFFTCCC

Aoorove
Coord
Coord

Info
ADo rove
Coord

Info
Info
Approve

LOW rislc.test plans will be apfroved by the owning AFRL Division Chief or their Deputy
and coordinated through 4121 OG before the start ofany flight operations. MEDIUM
rislc. test plans will be /ointly approved by the ow71ing AFRL Technical Directorate
Director and the 4 I 2' TWICC. HiGH rislc. test plans will be jointly approved by the
AFFTCICC and the AFRUCC. A formal approval briefing may be requested by the
approval authority for any test plan, but is required for all HIGH rislc.test plans. All
coordination comments will be resolved before final approval oftest execution and made
available to both AFFTC and AFRL leadership.

3) AFFTCI 91-5 details the signature authority for LOW, MEDIUM and
HIGH risk test cards for AFFTC programs and is modified to support thls
MOA as follows:
The test cards must be approved before each mission but no earlier than one week before
the mission. For LOW RiSK tests, the AFRL Division Chief (or equivalent) will approve
the cards. For MEDIUM RISK tests, the AFRL Technical Directorate Director and the
412"' Operations Group Commander (or equivalent). will approve the cards. For HIGH
RiSK tests. the AFRUCC and the 41 i" Test Wing Commander (or equivalent) will
approve the cards.
Once a mission is briefed and the mission slips due to a non-safoty related reason. but
otherwise remains unchanged, the appropriate approving official may elect to grant
approval by telephone or on an "until-flown" basis for up to one weelc. after original
approval. Ifmore than one weelc. has passed since the original approval, the approval
authority must be contacted and the date on the signature updated.
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4) Test conduct will otherwise comply with AFFTCI 91-5 procedures
unless modified or equivalent procedures are approved through
AFFTC/SET and the 412th OG/CC.
e. Provide a Government Flight Representative (GFR) for all AFRL programs
that fall under this MOA and require GFR oversight. The assigned GFR will
coordinate with both the AFRL and 412th OG when performing their duties.
f. Act as the lead agent and liaison with the 412th OG in all cases where
configuration control and aircraft modifications affect the research program 's test
plan approved baseline configuration.
4.2 AFFTC RESPONSffiiLITIES.
a. Provide the AFRL with a flight authority review and approval of all flight
activities to ensure AFRL test plans are conducted in accordance with applicable
Federal Aviation Regulations and/or Air Force 10 and 11 series instructions and
their AFMC and AFFTC Supplements. This responsibility·may be delegated to a
Government Flight Representative (GFR) when required by contract.
1) Process all waivers to governing regulations concerning flight test
operations.
2) Assist AFRL with establishing and approving pilot and operator
qualification, training and currency standards for AFRL research programs
involving flight activities to meet the intent of AFI ll-202Vl, V2, V3,
AFI 11-2FTV1, V2, V3 and their AFMC and AFFTC supplements.
3) Assist AFRL with establishing and approving flight authorization
requirements for AFRL research programs involving flight activities to
meet the intent of AFill-401 and its AFMC and AFFTC Supplements.
4) Assist AFRL with establishing and executing an Operational Risk
Management processes associated with AFRL research programs.
5) Establish processes to provide AFRL research programs involving
flight activities with the Flight Crew Information File (FCIF).
b. 412th OG will provide AFRL aircraft mishap reporting and accountability
assistance as the flight authority for all flight operations. Reporting and
accountability will be in accordance with AFI91-202, 91-204 and 91-206(1) and
AFMC and AFFTC supplements.
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1) 412111 OG will be the grounding and return-to-fly approval
authority for
individuals involved in a Class A or Class B mishap.
2) AFRL will retain mishap accountability and investigatio
n
responsibilities unless transferred IAW AFI guidance.
c. Coordinate and approve the technical and safety review
information obtained
throu gh AFRL Configuration Control, Technical Revie
W and Safet y Review
Board (CCBfTRB/SRB) processes with AFFT C organizations
to support AFRL

research programs while complying with the intent of Air Force
91 and 99 series
Instructions and their AFMC and AFFTC supplements.
1) Provide safety and technical assistance for AFRL resear
ch programs
that.are outside the expertise of AFRL. This may includ
e, but is not
limited to, providing a representative from within tbe 412•
OG to attend
program planning meetings, assist with the preparation of safety
and/or

technical documentation or attend TRB and/or SRB boards.

··

2) For all MEDIUM and HIGH risk assessed test plans, a 412111
00
member will be assigned to support the AFRL research progr
am with test
planning and integration with AFFT C technical, safety and
flight test
execution processes.
5. TER M OF AGR EEM ENT AND RIGH T TO TERM
INAT E. This memorandum
becomes effective on the date signed by both organizations
and remains in effect
indefinitely. Termination of this agreement is only valid if
both the AFR llCC and the
412th 00/C C agree in writing to terminate the agree
ment Amendments to this
agreement may be made with at least 90-days notification by
either party, in writing,
detail~g the procedures and processes to be amended.
This agreement shall be reviewed
annually.

J4£/?@.5?

TED F. BOWLDS, Maj Gen
Commander, AFRL

L
·

C.&~£'4 -

CURTIS M.~KE, Maj Gen

Commander, AFFT C

D. NEW, Maj Gen
tor of Operations
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Appendix B: Current Flight Test Process VSM
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Appendix C: Small UAV Costs and Mishap Data

SUAV

Cost Per Vehicle

Vehicles Flown

Total Amount

System Maturity

Sorties

Hours

Weight (kg)

Speed (m/s)

KE (KJ)

Mishaps

Quadrant

Alpha 60

$

800.00

7

$

5,600.00

Mature

78

20.33

7.7

24.7

2.3

4

Alpha 60

$

400.00

1

$

400.00

Mature

‐

‐

‐

‐

‐

‐

Arrow MAV Glider

$

1,200.00

1

$

1,200.00

Prototype

6

0.3

0.9

8.7

0.0

Basset

$

390,000.00

1

$

390,000.00

Prototype

3

0.9

317.5

61.7

604.3

Yes

1

4

Bat‐3

$

318,000.00

1

$

318,000.00

New

18

44

14.5

30.9

6.9

Yes

2

Big Stik

$

1,100.00

5

$

5,500.00

New

80

23.3

9

31.4

4.4

4

Blacktip

$

6,200.00

2

$

12,400.00

Prototype

73

14.85

5.4

49.9

6.7

4

BVM HiVast

$

28,000.00

1

$

28,000.00

New

12

1.5

31.7

102.9

167.8

3

DG303

$

17,800.00

2

$

35,600.00

New

23

20.8

‐

‐

‐

‐

Intimidator

$

1,100.00

5

$

5,500.00

New

35

12.9

9

44.8

9.0

4

MOP MAV BDI

$

24,000.00

1

$

24,000.00

New

2

0.2

4.5

49.9

5.6

4

Osprey (UAV)

$

2,333.00

7

$

16,331.00

Mature

40

22.15

27.2

33.4

15.2

4

Radian RC

$

250.00

1

$

250.00

Mature

7

0.3

0.9

8.7

0.0

4

Rascal

$

549.00

1

$

549.00

Mature

31

4.5

‐

25.7

‐

‐

RMAX

$

380,000.00

2

$

760,000.00

Mature

0

0
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11.3

5.9

2

ScanEagle

$

100,000.00

1

$

100,000.00

Mature

1

1

20

41.2

17.0

4

Silver Fox

$

100,000.00

1

$

100,000.00

Mature

4

9.5

16.3

28.3

6.5

Skate

$

30,000.00

4

$

120,000.00

New

64

24.5

0.9

25.7

0.3

Yes

4
4

Tandem Wing

$

3,000.00

2

$

6,000.00

Mature

7

0.6

‐

14

‐

Unicorn

$

17,000.00

1

$

17,000.00

Mature

39

15.9

4.5

24.7

1.4

4

Unicorn

$

22,400.00

1

$

22,400.00

Mature

‐

‐

‐

‐

‐

‐

Unicorn

$

18,700.00

3

$

56,100.00

Mature

‐

‐

‐

‐

‐

‐

$

1,462,832.00

523

218

$ 2,024,830.00

96

Yes

‐

SUAV Program Asset Cost

$ 133,000.00

$66,500 x 2 SUAVs

30,000.00

$

30,000.00

Estimated range cost

$ 2,054.79
$ 20,000.00

$
$

2,100.00
20,000.00

1 GS‐15 with 5 working days ($150K salary)
1 GS‐15 ($150K salary) with 2 working days + 4 junior member ($70K salary) with 25 working days

1,178.08
1,534.25

$
$

1,200.00
1,500.00

1 GS‐15 ($150K salary) with 1 working day + 4 junior members ($70K salary) with 1 working day
4 junior members ($70K salary) with 2 working days

2,465.75
410.96

$
$

2,500.00
400.00

1 O‐5 ($150K salary) with 6 working days
1 O‐5 ($150K salary) with 1 working day

821.92
‐

$
$

800.00
‐

1 O‐5 ($150K salary) with 2 working days

$133,000.00

Test Execution Cost
AFRL Review Cost
AFRL Risk Abatement Cost
Value Added Work
Non-value Added Work
Waste
Necessary Waste
AFFTC Review Cost
AFRL Risk Abatement Cost
Value Added Work
Non-value Added Work
Waste
Necessary Waste

$

Total UAV Asset and Liabilities

$ 191,465.75

$
$
$
$
$
$

$ 191,500.00
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